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ABSTRACT
Building Dupont: Capitalism, Manufactures, and
Place in Early America, 1800-1820
by
Christopher Manning
Dr. Greg Hise, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Though there is a rich literature dealing with the DuPont Company, the
historiography remains dedicated to studies of the family’s life, corporate methods,
working-class culture, and technological know-how. Rarely do studies engage the
company’s wider economic position or regional influence in early America. This study
analyzes the way early American culture guided and influenced DuPont’s growth and
success. It also examines the company’s efforts to promote manufactures, create markets,
and shape its surrounding landscape. As in other parts of the world, the development of
industrial capitalism, and the wider acceptance of domestic manufacturers and large-scale
industry in the United States accelerated the emergence of factory towns, milling villages,
and long-term urban growth. The DuPont Company and its founder E.I. du Pont played
an instrumental role in these developments and helped determine their specifically
American characteristics. Furthermore, this thesis asserts that the environment in and
around Wilmington shaped DuPont’s early development, and that the firm was
instrumental in organizing the economic, social, and physical world around it.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Inspiration comes from the culture around us and the places we inhabit. Essential to
all cultures is the network of individuals and ideas that compose it. In my own growth
and education I have benefited from the assistance of wonderful faculty guidance and a
supportive family environment. In academia, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas’
History Department has helped me feel worthy of this degree. My advisor, Dr. Greg Hise,
treated me as a colleague and with respect from the moment we met. I am grateful for his
wise council, friendship, and continued encouragement. Dr. David Holland guided me
through my first semester in graduate school, and I am continually amazed by his
erudition and motivated by his scholarly and teaching example. In two semesters as Dr.
Colin Loader’s Graduate Assistant and student, I can quite simply say—in addition to
being a fellow Boston Red Sox fan—he makes complex theoretical ideas tangible and
engaging. Also in the History Department, Drs. Andy Kirk and Michelle Tusan have
shown me a great deal of kindness and support. It has been rewarding getting to know
Bill Smith who, as a member of the School of Environmental and Public Affairs, helped
me explore a range of non-historical topics.
My time in Las Vegas has surely been productive, but California remains the source
of my inspiration. I have lived most of my life in the San Francisco Bay Area and can
think of few places that offer a better modern-day example of innovative culture and the
way industries organize landscapes. The region is also home to many of my immediate
friends and family members. It is doubtful I would be where I am in my studies without
them. I am greatly indebted to my parents for their love, support, and confidence in my
abilities. They have always made returning home relaxing and special. Finally, more than
anyone else, Laura Salcido has tolerated my absence, enhanced my spirits, and provided
iv

much needed respite from academia and the nine-to-five business-world grind. I cannot
imagine a better gift.

v



TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 1

“OF THE FINEST QUALITY”: PROMOTING AND DEFENDING
MANUFACTURES IN EARLY NATIONAL AMERICA .................... 6
Capitalism, Culture, and Industrialists ..................................................... 6
From Free Markets to Neo-Mercantilism: Economic Sentiments at the
Turn of the Century................................................................................ 13
The Economic State: Physiocracy and DuPont’s French Background .. 20
Industrial Boosters and National Prosperity .......................................... 23
Piracy and Legitimacy ........................................................................... 29

CHAPTER 2

DUPONT AND AMERICA’S EARLY ECONOMIC FRONTIER ..... 36
“Too Big to Fail” ................................................................................... 36
“This Feeling of Deep Interest for your Country”: DuPont and Federal
Support ................................................................................................... 42
“To Send Them by Way of”: The Creation of Powder Markets............ 51
Frontiers and Development .................................................................... 59

CHAPTER 3

LOCATION AND CREATION: THE MID-ATLANTIC,
WILMINGTON, AND DUPONT’S WORKING ENVIRONMENT ... 63
Innovative Spaces and Creating Places.................................................. 63
Environment and Society in Wilmington and the Mid-Atlantic ............ 70
Creating a Working Environment: Selecting a Site and Industrial
Organization ........................................................................................... 82
Industrial Accidents along the Brandywine ........................................... 93
Urban Growth and Industry ................................................................... 97

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 101
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 106
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 113

vi



LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10

E.I. du Pont & Lavoisier ................................................................................. 23
Map Depicting the Brandywine and Christina Rivers .................................... 39
Industry along the Brandywine, 1822 ............................................................ 42
Meeting Between E.I. du Pont & Thomas Jefferson, 1801 ............................ 44
DuPont Company Powder Diffusion .............................................................. 58
Map, An Eye-Draught of the Mammoth Cave in Warren County [Ky] ......... 61
Map of the American Coast ............................................................................ 71
Plan of Wilmington and its Environs ............................................................. 74
Lands Owned by E.I. du Pont ......................................................................... 90
E.I. du Pont Drawings of Powder Mills and Machinery ................................ 94

vii



INTRODUCTION
“The Wisdom of the world has been, and is fairly attainable by us, as by other
industrious and qualified nations, and the inventive genius of the people of the United
States has produced a very great number of curious and valuable instruments and
machines.”
Tench Coxe1
In A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures Tench Coxe addressed two fundamental
sentiments shared by many in America’s early republic. First, that wisdom, knowledge,
and understanding were all obtainable to the United States’ industrious population.
Second, that this industrious spirit led to valuable creations and new tools with which to
engage the world. But these words, and others throughout this work, also imply that
collecting wisdom and creating these tools was some form of destiny or purpose for the
American people. It was something that they should achieve, or better yet, something
they were meant to achieve more so than any other peoples. “It would have been a mine
of wealth, lost to the country,” Coxe wrote, “if the talent to invent the invaluable saw gin,
to prepare cotton for the manufacturer’s card, had not been exerted, and if the inventive
and fabricating powers of our citizens minds and bodies had not been applied to steam
energy.”2 Americans were hardworking, vigilant people, and in the newly United States it
was their job to invent, produce, and improve. Those who did none of these things were
depleting their own fortunes, and worse, diminishing national wealth.
In America’s early national period—roughly between 1789 and 1830—statements
like these were tied to economic growth and development. In the decades after the
Revolution, politicians and citizens throughout the country discussed and debated

1

Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures for the year 1810 (Philadelphia: Cornman, 1814)
Early American Imprints Series II: Shaw-Shoemaker, 1801-1819 (Accessed: October 25, 2009),49.
2
Coxe, A Statement of the Arts, 50.
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potential directions for the newly independent economy, all while making individual
economic choices. Historian Lance Banning suggests that the Founding Fathers had
distinctive views about the economic policies “necessary to secure a permanent
foundation for the nation’s freedom.”3 The Founders, however, were not the only
individuals with strong opinions on how to direct the national economy. Planters,
farmers, manufacturers, laborers, and other ordinary citizens all held strong feelings
about how to secure freedom and national stability. For one example, some manufactures
envisioned “a nation of producers,” that could withdraw from world-trade altogether and
avoid draining specie from the national coffers.4 This was in sharp contrast to the
internationalist sentiments that permeated post-Revolutionary War discussions about the
economy. Statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison envisioned a national
economy tied to free international trade. They labored to open overseas markets and
counteract American dependence on British trade. In contrast to Jefferson’s and
Madison’s Anglophobia, Alexander Hamilton, while also focusing on the international
arena, hoped to link economic growth to revenues earned from British imports.
Different economic preferences gained traction in specific localities like cities and
hinterlands, or the American North and South. In the South, plantation households
organized the economy and society by directing slave or wage labor and facilitating
market exchange. In Manhattan, as limited real estate became a valuable commodity,
investors and businessmen increasingly gained control over a scarce housing market and



3

Lance Banning, “Political Economy and the Creation of the Federal Republic,” in Devising Liberty:
Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1995), 11-12.
4
Lawrence Peskin, Manufacturing Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 6.
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placed political power in the hands of a few prominent landowners.5 The point is that
there was no clear consensus, no one direction and no one dominating endeavor or
activity that defined the antebellum economy.
Despite these differing and often competing viewpoints in the nation’s early years,
nearly all of these groups desired some form of economic growth and national
development.6 As capitalist behavior took hold, many seemed to share Coxe’s sentiment
that a mine of wealth should not be wasted. The chapters that follow consider the
emergence of domestic industries in this economic arena. Specifically, they ask how a
nationalizing and capitalist economic culture motivated the actions of manufactures, and
how those producers defended the significance of their productions. They also analyze
the contributions of industrialists to national development through the creation and

5

A good work on the Southern economy is Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development
of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1988); and for Manhattan, Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent 1785-1850
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
6
Economic growth commonly refers to an increase in the productive capacity of an economy. This might
apply to individuals, groups, or entire societies that increase output and trade through such methods as
product specialization, a division of labor, or the application of new technologies that allow a fixed input to
yield a larger output. See, Robert B. Eklund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison, Microeconomics: Private Markets
and Public Choice, Sixth Edition (Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2000), 32-33. Historian Douglass North
further explains economic growth in the context of early national America. He argues that economic
growth must begin with a successful trade in exports, because initially domestic markets are small and
scattered. An expanding external market will therefore encourage general economic growth by increasing
the number of producers and consumers participating in exchange. This growth provides for an “increase in
the size of the domestic market, growth in money income, and the spread of specialization and division of
labor,” which encourages future growth and development. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the
United States, 1790-1860 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), 1-3. National and economic
development also requires an explanation. My use of “development” in this thesis defers to historian and
cultural theorist Raymond Williams’ description of developed land as that which has been utilized or
harvested for its natural resources. These resources are then used to benefit the ends of a particular society.
The actual development of a place might imply the construction of buildings, roads, storage facilities, or
other features that help facilitate economic and social connection or even agricultural plots that yield
sustenance for society. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Revised
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 1983), 102-104. Development is also a process that
yields things, as Jane Jacob asserts, rather than representing a mere collection of things. Jane Jacobs, The
Nature of Economies (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 31-33. Economic development can therefore be
explained as the process of creating products from resources based on a society’s definition of value. These
products are then exchanged in national or international markets. When development increases along with
the volume of exchange an economy grows.
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expansion of markets and the organization of landscapes.
The rise of a manufacturing economy implied a certain type of development that is
most visible in the actions and efforts of individual manufactures. One such individual
was Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, a gunpowder manufacturer and founder and proprietor of
the E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company. This study engages the first two decades of the
DuPont Company (1800-1820), and argues that manufacturers lobbied for productive
economic growth and development during the early republic.7 The DuPont Company in
particular believed manufactures supported independence and prosperity through
domestic production and increased economic exchange. Their actions also contributed to
economic expansion through the creation of new markets for their powder. Ultimately,
the growth they advocated was physical as well. America’s emerging industrial economy
was the outcome of productive activity by DuPont and other industrialists whose actions
were “responsible for urban and regional development.”8 In constructing a working
factory environment, DuPont effectually organized the social and economic lives of its
workers and influenced the landscape around them.
While there is a fairly rich literature dealing with the DuPont Company, the
historiography remains dedicated to studies of the family’s life, corporate methods,
working-class culture, and technological know-how.9 Rarely do studies engage the
company’s wider economic position or regional influence in early America. This study


7

In my discussion of the company, I have chosen to use the current spelling of “DuPont.” When referring
to the family, however, the name will be written as “du Pont.”
8
Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial
Growth (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), 8.
9
For general works on the DuPont Company’s history, see William H.A. Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware:
A Fantastic Dynasty (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964); William S. Dutton, Du Pont:
Autobiography of a Scientific Enterprise (New York: Scribner, 1952); Adrian Kinnane, DuPont: From the
Banks of the Brandywine to Miracles of Science (E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, 2002); Pap A.
Ndiaye, Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America, trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
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analyzes the way early American culture guided and influenced DuPont’s growth and
success. It also examines the company’s efforts to promote manufactures, create markets,
and shape landscapes in local, regional, and national arenas. As in other parts of the
world, the development of industrial capitalism, and the wider acceptance of domestic
manufacturers and large-scale industry in the United States accelerated the emergence of
factory towns, milling villages, and long-term urban growth.10 DuPont played an
instrumental role in these developments and helped determine their specifically American
characteristics.
Accordingly, DuPont’s promotion and defense of manufactures and their necessity
for national development is this thesis’ first chapter. The second chapter considers how
the company created powder markets both through the acquisition of agents and
participation in political and economic networks of exchange. The third chapter examines
how regions and locations fuel innovation and how industry and high-technology
businesses can then organize and shape built environments. Overall, the study analyzes
the role of individual producers and highlights their participation in a culture that
determined economic relations and shaped national development.



10

Storper and Walker, The Capitalist Imperative, 6.
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CHAPTER 1
“OF THE FINEST QUALITY”: PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DOMESTIC
MANUFACTURES IN EARLY NATIONAL AMERICA
Capitalism, Culture, and Industrialists
In the 1830s, while on his now famous tour through the United States, Alexis de
Tocqueville reflected on what caused many Americans to follow industrial callings.
Democracy, he argued, was the impetus for such a life calling. He believed that
democracy, and its American manifestation in this case, led men to “prefer one kind of
labor to another,” and specifically, “while it diverts them from agriculture, it encourages
their taste for commerce and manufactures.”1 Without a traditional aristocracy or
assurance of position, rich men in democracies were always searching for new sources of
wealth. It is telling that in Tocqueville’s 1830s, they found this source in trade and
manufactures. Fifty years earlier, America’s society and economy were predominately
agricultural, with many of a republican mindset fearing the social decay and decline in
virtue that inevitably accompanied large-scale manufactures.2 But in Tocqueville’s
America, larger industrial enterprises were increasingly common, and such fears were
scarce. In short succession, the country witnessed the arrival and proliferation of
steamboats, trains, canals, and the electrical telegraph. As one historian has remarked, the
early republic “was a crucial, if not the crucial, period in the development of that
trademark characteristic of American society and economy, modern capitalism.”3 Yet, the

1

Democracy in America, Vol. 2, ed. Phillips Bradley and trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Vintage Books,
1990), 154.
2
Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
3
Paul Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early American Republic,” in Wages of Independence:
Capitalism in the Early American Republic, ed. Paul Gilje (Madison: Madison House, 1997), 1.
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emergence of a capitalist economy in early America, and specifically the rise of larger
scale industrial capitalism, was not predetermined.4 Rather, following America’s
independence from Great Britain, it was not entirely clear how, or in what form, the
economy would proceed. These observations have led historians to analyze how and why
industrialization emerged when it did, and its effects on the national economy.
Recently, a number of historians have engaged these questions by viewing capitalist
production and industrial growth as a cultural phenomenon. Though “capitalism” is a
complex term, it usually refers to an economic system of relatively free exchange, private
ownership of property and goods, a commoditization of the labor force, and is
characterized by the investment of “capital” or resources in an enterprise with the
expectation of receiving a gain in return. Additionally, this system stresses hard work and
delayed gratification for individuals.5 For Joyce Appleby, capitalism as an economic
system is contingent on time, place, laws, and customs. Beginning in England with the
“convergence of agricultural improvements, global explorations, and scientific
advances,” capitalism came into the world embedded in a culture’s expressions and
actions.6 Appleby argues that changes in knowledge, technology, and behavior fostered
economic expansion and gave rise to a new way of organizing markets. This emerging


4

My use of the terms “industry,” “industrialism,” and “industrialization,” throughout this work requires
some clarification. According to Raymond Williams’ helpful explanation of key social science and
humanities terms, there are “two main senses” of industry: “the human quality of sustained action or effort;
[and] an institution or set of institutions for production and trade.” My use conforms to the later definition,
and more specifically with the word’s nineteenth century association to the application of technical
inventions to organized production on a large-scale as distinct from both traditional agricultural production
and small-scale craft and artisan manufactures. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture
and Society, Revised Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 1983), 165-168.
5
This definition is largely drawn from: Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010), 6-7; and Paul Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early
American Republic,” in Wages of Independence, 7. Williams observes that “capitalist” began to refer to
those who controlled the means of production. “Capitalism” can also designate an entire society, or the
features of a society, where a capitalist economic system predominates. Williams, Keywords, 50-52.
6
Appleby, The Relentless Revolution, 21.
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capitalist system arose from the practiced cultural behaviors of a people who “acquired
the power to bend political and social institutions to their demands.”7 They did this by
privately investing in the economy, encouraging disciplined work and ingenuity of new
technologies to enhance productivity, and ultimately by reorganizing the political and
social systems to empower a moneyed aristocracy or bourgeoisie in Western Europe and
the United States.
Similarly, in his comparative analysis of industrialization in Britain and Germany,
Richard Biernacki recognizes that practices and techniques are arranged by cultural
definitions, with culture as a driver of actions. The vectors of influence run from culture
to economic arrangement, rather than vice-versa. For example, in England, where a
market economy developed before labor was commoditized, finished manufactured
goods became the measure of a worker’s worth. Alternatively, in Germany, where the
manufacturing of commodities such as wool developed prior to market demand, workers
were compensated based on the time and labor they expended on the production process.
For Biernacki, the commoditization of labor and the emergence of capitalism took shape
differently according to the cultural assumptions of Englishmen and Germans. In each
country, culture was a “positive shaper rather than an accompaniment or passive resource
for institutions.”8 In Biernacki’s and Appleby’s analyses, culture is a definitive force of
market production and exchange.
How might an examination of cultures of capitalism help explain industrialization in
the early American republic? For one, it suggests that, at least for England, capitalism
and market relations preceded industrialization. It can be argued that this was the case in


7

Appleby, The Relentless Revolution, 118.
Richard Biernacki, The Fabrication of Labor: Germany and Britain, 1640-1914 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1995), 475.
8
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America as well, and that capitalist behavior and market organization defined the
beginnings of industrial production. One way this can be observed is by taking into
consideration historians’ assertions that individuals are the practicing embodiment of
their culture. As Appleby argues in an earlier essay, European demand for American
grains brought ordinary men into the Atlantic trade world, and enhanced the value of
their harvests.9 By involving themselves in this productive economy; by choosing to
invest in houses, property, public works, and cities; and by accumulating wealth through
production and trade early Americans mimicked the capitalistic behaviors of their
English counterparts. Once independent and free to express themselves, many
Americans—both urban and rural—noticeably became involved in national and
international production and commodity trade.10 This led to economic growth through the



9

Joyce Appleby, “Commercial Farming and the ‘Agrarian Myth’ in the Early Republic,” The Journal of
American History, 68, No. 4 (March, 1982): 833-849.
10
American historians have offered several explanations for how and when capitalist production and
expanded markets took root in America. While it is widely understood that agriculture and industry existed
in America since the early days of colonization, the contention has been on when exactly and how it
became capitalist, or investment and market oriented, in nature. As mentioned, historian Joyce Appleby is
particularly concerned with the specific developments that allowed capitalism to take root. For her, a
market revolution of sorts took place in England long before the early nineteenth century, and it occurred
through individual participation and action. The English and Netherlands’ agricultural revolutions
increased output, freed up labor, and opened the countryside to commercial relations. Before the American
Revolution, Appleby, and a number of scholars have argued that the colonists were becoming more rather
than less British. This ultimately excelled their desires for independence and greater participation in the
world’s marketplaces. Following the Constitution’s ratification, Republican notions of liberty extended to
the economy and stressed the idea that individuals could improve themselves through profitable exchange
in a market society. See especially, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican
Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984). Historians Christopher Clark and
Cathy Matson both see capitalism taking root during this time, and in similar ways. In his analysis of
capitalism’s origins in rural Massachusetts, Clark notes that “people did not just respond to things, they
made them happen.” In short time, Massachusetts’ rural west went from an economy dominated by
independent farmers, to one participating in a national marketplace. See, Christopher Clark, The Roots of
Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 8. Matson
also recognizes the release of economic energy following the nation’s political organization and
stabilization of revenue. See, Cathy Matson, “Capitalizing Hope: Economic Thought and the Early
National Economy,” in Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic, ed. Paul Gilje
(Madison: Madison House, 1997). William Cronon, however, locates the origins of this economy in a far
earlier period. If events after the Revolution finally spelled the triumph of capitalism, its habits and actions
had a long history dating back to early English settlements in the New World. See, William Cronon,
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exportation of raw materials and ultimately to investments in domestic manufactures that
could process materials locally for sale in both domestic and international markets. All
this is to highlight two points about the emergence of industrialization in early America.
First, manufactures and industrialization came about primarily through cultural behaviors
and actions of individuals participating in an expanding national and international
economy.11 Second, those arguments for a market revolution that “created ourselves and
most of the world we know” have been exaggerated.12 Instead, by analyzing the actions
of individual producers and entrepreneurs to create and defend their products, expand
markets, and shape their environments, it is clear that their cultural efforts, attitudes, and
behaviors stimulated American industrialization. America created a “Market Revolution,”
not the other way around.
The origins and actions of one firm, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, a
gunpowder manufacture just outside Wilmington, Delaware, and its proprietor Eleuthère
Irénée du Pont, provide an excellent case study for understanding America’s industrial

Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang,
1983).
11
A number of historians have recently drawn attention to the important economic role of individuals in the
early republic. Lawrence Peskin notes that while much has been said about the industrial revolution, little
has been said about industrial revolutionaries. For him this suggests what has been a preoccupation with
forces rather than humans when explaining economic change. Lawrence Peskin, Manufacturing
Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2003),1. Jonathan Prude also suggests that “the coming of industrial order—and of factories—
happened because specific people acted for specific reasons.” Jonathan Prude, “Capitalism,
Industrialization, and the Factory in Post-Revolutionary America,” in Wages of Independence, 91. Steven
Watts is also concerned with the individual’s role in the economy, but he is also interested in process. In his
analysis, the shift from republicanism to liberal capitalism came about due to the “cultural hegemony” of an
influential socio-political group. He uses “cultural hegemony” to refer to “the way by which dominant class
values, organization, and definitions of reality seem to attract ‘spontaneous’ loyalty rather than simply
being imposed on society through brute force.” Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making
of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), Introduction.
Though I partially agree with Watts, my use of culture here is less a part of elite society and “spontaneous
loyalty,” and is instead expressed through the behaviors and actions of commoners and elites alike that,
through their participation and decisions, drive economies in particular directions.
12
Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 5.
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beginnings. The DuPont story is useful for several reasons. First, the company’s location
in a growing industrial region and innovative community made it a direct participant in
the physical growth of industry and the encouragement of economic advancement.
Second, by acquiring sales agents and successfully marketing powder to a number of
states, the firm bolstered hopes that American industries could supply domestic
consumption. Finally, the du Pont family’s actions and beliefs highlight the nation’s
shifting political economy from one based heavily on agriculture and post-revolutionary
free-trade to a post-War of 1812 embrace of large-scale manufactures and mercantilist
protections.
In 1800, E.I. du Pont, along with his father (French Physiocrat and economist Pierre
Samuel du Pont de Nemours) brother, and their families, emigrated from France to
America. The family’s motivation was to speculate on western lands and develop a
profitable commercial carrying business between France and the West Indies.13 When
shortly after settling in America their commercial enterprise DuPont de Nemours Father,
Sons & Company failed, the family was forced to rely on what had originally been a
supplemental plan: the manufacture of gunpowder. The family hoped that E.I. du Pont’s
considerable skill in manufacturing powder, along with the government’s need for it,
would provide a “positive certainty of great profits.”14 Shortly after initiating operations,
these hopes were realized. Production, sales, and profits generally increased—with a few
down periods—over the next several decades, as the company’s reputation, output, and
physical footprint grew. Its proprietor, E.I. du Pont, however, faced a number of issues

13

Mack Thompson, “Causes and Circumstances of the Du Pont Family’s Emigration,” French Historical
Studies, 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), 67-77.
14
Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours to Jacques Bidermann, New York, December 1, 1800, in Life of
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary Correspondence, 1799-1802, Vol. 5, trans. B. G. du Pont
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1924), 191-192.
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and challenges while working to achieve these results. These included not only the
hardships involved in transferring French techniques and processes to America, in
manufacturing the powder itself, and in overcoming the general scarcity of wage labor
due to the availability of inexpensive land, but also the struggle to protect trade secrets
and ward off labor piracy while maintaining creative control over the company and
building trust in its products. E.I. du Pont was a significant promoter of manufactures in
the early republic, and his active participation in a community of manufactures,
producers, and economists should not be ignored. Together his struggles and promotional
endeavors highlight the individual industrialist’s role as a cultural actor striving to
participate in and shape a growing market economy.
One way to answer questions, such as those posed at the outset of this chapter, about
the composition and direction of the United States’ early national economy is to look at
individual actors within a culture. E.I. du Pont and other industrialists established
manufacturing operations and helped influence perceptions of how those industries were
received. In a society pursuing economic development and expressing an increasingly
capitalistic mentality, small and large manufactures and agricultural producers alike
expanded markets, equated industrial growth with national prosperity, and secured
legislation that recognized the legitimacy of their businesses. While Tocqueville was
astute in associating industrial growth and democracy, there is more to the story.
Democracy did not alone stimulate manufacturers to increasingly expand production,
technology, and markets; rather they expanded as part of a culture that rewarded
individual efforts. Yet their lives were not merely culturally determined, it still took
distinct political, religious, and economic realities to motivate their actions. The
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eighteenth-century Atlantic world’s developing market culture compelled individuals to
seek new identities, and participate in larger economic activity. In the United States,
where democracy, nationalism, and conceptions of freedom helped stimulate this activity,
it took individuals and businesses, like E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, behaving in
specific ways to secure the growth of industry, its means of exchange, and the rules of
economic participation.

From Free Markets to Neo-Mercantilism: Economic Sentiments
at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century
When the du Pont family arrived in America at the beginning of the nineteenth
century they entered a nation engaged in a dynamic debate about how to define and
determine its economic future. Between the 1780s and 1820s, America transitioned from
a nation espousing principles of free-trade and in search of international markets for its
agricultural produce to one advancing commercial protections and emphasizing internal
developments as well as national economic growth in the agricultural, commercial, and
manufacturing sectors. In hindsight this transition seems dramatic, as much of the
country’s population during this period continued to be employed in agriculture and live
in rural communities. Additionally, many influential public thinkers and officials such as
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson spoke of the virtues of agriculture and rebuked
the vices and moral decay associated with large manufactures.15 Yet, during the years in
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question, industrial pursuits and large-scale manufactures occupied an increasingly
visible economic role. Especially along the eastern seaboard in the mid-Atlantic and
Northeast, new industries emerged and began to employ a moderate percent of the
nation’s population alongside a consistently growing agricultural sector.16 Proprietors and
firms such as DuPont were instrumental in facilitating these economic changes. As one
scholar asserts, ordinary people’s desire to consume motivated their industriousness and
productivity and forged the “political, legal, and social milieu” that liberated
entrepreneurial and commercial dynamism across the eastern United States.17 Throughout
this transitional period, the nation’s emerging capitalist culture composed of productive
individuals stimulated the economic changes that were taking place. To better understand
DuPont’s role as a contributor to these changes, it is helpful to begin by depicting
America’s early economic climate and analyzing the motivations for change that resulted
in an expanding domestic economy.
Following the Revolution, American foreign policy under the Articles of
Confederation acted to open international markets and advance policies of commercial
freedom. This initially took the form of discrimination against British mercantilist
practices embodied in Thomas Jefferson’s efforts as a foreign minister to create a
commercial treaty with France that counteracted Britain’s continued control of the market
for many American raw materials. Since post-colonial America remained a
predominantly agricultural nation producing an abundance of foodstuffs and valuable

endeavors that required subservience to a business owner or boss would “suffocate the germ of virtue,” and
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16
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17
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14



cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, and wheat, the maintenance of foreign trade and the
creation of markets was critical for the economy’s success. France “held the key” to
America’s commercial problem because it provided markets for American produce in
exchange for French “manufactures, oils, wines, tropical produce, and other articles.”18 It
was believed that the French trade offered a way for Americans to escape their
commercial dependence on Britain by opening new avenues for exchange, despite the
fact that it merely shifted dependence from one nation to another.19 Jefferson’s support
for a Franco-American treaty achieved little more than advancing a mercantilist policy
that ultimately failed when French nationalists also abandoned their own prospects of free
trade following the onset of the French Revolution.
In 1789, following the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison continued
Jefferson’s policies from his position in the House of Representatives. Madison also
pursued a policy of commercial discrimination against the British by supporting a
universal tonnage duty on merchant vessels of countries with whom America had treaties
and higher duties on those—namely the British—with whom they did not.20 This policy
was eventually rejected by the Senate and ensured, for the time-being, that neither
Jefferson nor Madison were successful in dismantling Britain’s supremacy over
American trade.
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In his role as the Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton presented an opposing
view to Madison’s and Jefferson’s that also looked to the international arena for a way to
develop American commerce and secure economic independence. Unlike Madison and
Jefferson, who were most concerned with the productive sectors of the American
economy represented by individual landowners and agriculturalists, Hamilton believed
that the merchant class performed the most creative role in the nation’s economy. He
therefore set out to create a political economy that centered on the merchant class’ wide
variety of “knowledge, experience, and ideas.”21 Hamilton imagined a dynamic and
active central government that needed stable revenue to properly oversee national affairs.
Under his system, revenue would come from a series of duties on imported goods. Since
ninety-percent of America’s imports during this time came from Great Britain, any
disruption of trade with that nation would destroy his entire system.22 The importance of
maintaining amiable relations with Great Britain was essential to Hamilton’s plan and
directly contradicted the policies presented by Jefferson and Madison. The two opposing
sides represent the nation’s early political split over how to shape the national economy.
Whereas Hamilton sought to maintain close commercial relations with Great Britain and
model America’s fiscal policy on a system of funded debt to support the national
government, Jefferson and Madison actively labored to break America’s economic
dependence on Britain and establish alternative outlets for the country’s agricultural
produce.
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The Madisonian and Jeffersonian political economy ostensibly gave most support to
the domestic production of goods as well as individual farmers and proprietors. While
Jefferson and Madison’s early commercial policies may have failed, the spirit and
motivation behind them gripped the nation following the pivotal election of 1800. The
divisions formed in the earlier opposition between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian
political and economic camps came to the foreground in this election with each group
believing that “victory for their side was essential to the nation’s survival.”23 The election
of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency cemented the presence of a new economic culture
in the nation’s highest offices. Jefferson’s earlier search for “a national system of political
economy capable of advancing the interests of the American republic,” was now in a
position to energize the nation’s economy.24 Over the next thirty or so years, America’s
political culture highlighted the national economic importance of yeoman farmers,
laborers, and a multitude of independent producers. The advancement of Jefferson’s
productive, agrarian, and market based system over Hamilton’s financial and merchantled commercial one also acknowledged the rising fortunes of a particular type of
capitalist economy that valued producers ahead of financial middlemen and those
providing transportation services.25
Yet, even the triumph of the Jeffersonian system does not alone explain how or why
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Americans began to support domestic manufactures and large scale industries. But, as
historians have recently argued, the acknowledged economic importance of individual
producers and the growth of commercial agriculture were important prerequisites for the
advancement of American manufactures.26 In addition to this, a number of policies
passed during Jefferson’s administration, and those of his successors, as well as the
actions of individuals and the advocacy societies they formed generated support for
industrial production and resulted in what can best be described as a neo-mercantilistic
political economy.27 The Embargo of 1807 and the subsequent Non-Intercourse Acts
were implemented with the hope that foreign nations would entreat fairly with American
when they realized the importance of its trade. Instead, these policies merely helped
propel the country into war with Britain. In time, the United States’ failure to secure
favorable trading rights with Britain and other nations led a popular desire to focus
instead on internal economic development and growth.
In 1815, President James Madison called for the creation of a new national bank, a
tariff to protect American manufactures, and support for improvements in transportation
infrastructure such as roads and canals. Congress agreed to all of these measures. Even
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Jefferson and Madison agreed that an export economy left America dependent on a
Europe that could not be relied upon. Ultimately, Jefferson’s Republican Party shifted
their support from the exportation of productive agriculture to encourage national
prosperity through subsidies to commerce, manufactures, and internal improvements.28
These ambitions culminated in Henry Clay’s “American System” that successfully
increased the tariff in 1824, and generally proposed “a national transportation network
that would make the United States economically independent of Europe and
geographically interdependent within itself.”29 All these prospects ensured that America’s
economic development had adopted a decisively nationalist agenda that not only
promoted agricultural production, but also ensured legal and financial protections for
nascent manufactures and commercial industries. By adding these protections, America
in the 1820s began to resemble a conglomeration of both Hamilton’s strong central
government with revenue collecting abilities, and the productive spirit of Jefferson’s
individualist market participants. Additionally, Clay’s system helped usher in a collection
of economic policies that were essentially neo-mercantilist, using tariffs to promote
production and exports and discourage imports. Not everyone, however, favored the
government’s active role in the economy. Senator and Vice-President John Calhoun,
though also favoring economic growth, believed that independent producers should be
free to find markets without the assistance or hindrance of the federal government.30 Yet,
despite protests by Calhoun and others largely located in the South, the protective
policies of the early 1820s emerged as a strong political option during a contentious age
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of American development that highlighted the state’s role in directing the economy.

The Economic State: Physiocracy and Du Pont’s French Background
The du Ponts arrived in America fairly early on in the progression of these economic
debates. Despite coming from another country and society, the family had for some time
participated in similar economic discussions in France. Additionally, much as the United
States came to rely on an increasingly powerful central government to ensure economic
growth and protection, the du Pont’s hailed from a French society where they lobbied for
a strong government that would support and direct economic activity. Beginning in the
sixteenth century, states became central economic actors in the European economy, and
while in France, the du Ponts—especially the patriarch Pierre Samuel du Pont de
Nemours—participated extensively in political and economic discussion and policy
formation at the national level.31 As a follower of the Physiocratic school, P. S. du Pont
helped erect and disseminate a complex science of wealth that constituted the first
modern school of economics.32 Physiocracy meant the rule of nature, and the conviction
that agriculture was the only source of national wealth resulted in support for policies that
removed restrictions on the sale of grain and an overall freeing of trade. Generally,
Physiocracy’s defense of economic individualism, absolute land ownership, legal
uniformity, and a national market where human labor could be bought and sold
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demonstrated early support for a capitalist economy.33
Despite an emphasis on the radical liberalization of the French economy, the
Physiocrats were a conservative body that supported the monarchy and state power. They
believed that individual economic activity would have a positive consequence at the
macro-economic level—the collective interest was the sum of individual interests.34 In
total, through the promotion of free trade and the modernization of agriculture they hoped
to restore the French kingdom’s legitimate political authority. Thomas Jefferson and
other Americans championed their methods and envisioned them as a potential avenue
for the new nation’s political economy. The intended results of the Physiocrats’ measures
offered a new direction for the United States; an economy that would support national
strength and development, but also needed federal and state government support for its
promotion. In essence, this philosophy advocated agricultural and productive growth, but
to achieve it, the government’s strength and support was necessary. This was the
philosophy the du Pont’s carried with them to the United States in 1800, and it was
already present in many respects in the new social order supported by the Jeffersonian
Republicans.
E.I. du Pont’s own background in France convinced him of the importance of
productive industry and its need for government support. His experience also positioned
him for manufacturing success in America. Before the French Revolution, E.I du Pont
learned the skills and techniques of powder making at the state-run gunpowder mills at
Essonne outside of Paris. He trained under the famed French chemist Antoine Lavoisier
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who had engineered new techniques to improve the quality of powder.35 It was these
techniques that Irénée took with him to the United States a decade later. But even more
important is the relationship between industrial production and the state that he observed
while a student at Essonne. Because he matured in a society where the government
involved itself heavily in the administration and development of scientific industries, du
Pont was never entirely able to diminish the necessity of this relationship. Furthermore,
the Physiocratic principles espoused by his father stressed this relationship as well. Only
a strong central government could protect an individual’s right to produce and freely
participate in economic exchange. In the United States, E.I. du Pont continued to exercise
these ideals as he actively sought government approval for his powder manufactory,
labored to obtain government business, and petitioned for policies to support industry.
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Figure 1: Portrait of E.I. du Pont (standing) studying with Antoine Lavoisier (sitting).
This depiction would have the viewer believe that du Pont trained intimately with
Lavoisier, but Darwin Stapleton suggests that this was probably not the case. The powder
works at Essonne were large and catered to a number of students. It is also relevant that
much of du Pont’s training was to prepare him as a powder administrator and not as a
powder worker per se. See Darwin Stapleton, “Élève des Poudres,” 231. Source: E. I. du
Pont & Lavoisier, painting by Wright, Portrait File, PF_20090605_201.tif, Hagley
Museum and Library.

Industrial Boosters and National Prosperity
Within a few short years of the Constitution’s ratification, praise for manufactures
and innovative, labor-saving machinery appeared in various areas of the country. “It must
23



afford great pleasure to the friends of American manufactures,” one newspaper read, “to
see the rapid improvements which have, within these few years, been made in machinery
within the United States.”36 Praising individuals who defied the odds against mechanical
inventions, this description of Oliver Evans’ new carding machine is an early example of
the growing enthusiasm for manufactures particularly in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast.
This news report further asserted that Evans’ machine, when in use, enabled individual
proprietors to “excel Europe in the manufactory of cards.”37 Indeed, this was important
news to the friends of domestic manufactures who hoped machines like Evans’ would
fuel the new American economy. That the country could best European manufactures
appealed to post-revolutionary hopes and desires for independence, opportunity, and
freedom. As one historian observes, “social equality and personal autonomy had an
economic dimension” in the early republic, and because of this, “Americans seemed
determined to avoid pecuniary dependence on others.”38 Though the desire for economic
independence was a growing sentiment for many, domestic manufactures and other
industries still had to be made safe and viable for those wishing to invest in or establish
new enterprises. In the republic’s nascent years this became the task of individual
industrialists, economic boosters, and supporters of manufactures.
Historians have recently equated the emergence of domestic manufactures with the
nation’s early political economy and republican identity. For one historian, nationalism
was a strong motivator for economic growth. Specifically, the American Revolution and
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subsequent independence “opened up new vistas that ultimately accelerated and reshaped
developments underway.”39 These new projects were perhaps assisted, another historian
argues, by policies and market relations. Protective policies, like increased tariffs and
Jefferson’s 1807 Embargo, ostensibly offered assistance to domestic manufactures. In the
1810s and after, it was hoped that the American System and other measures would
develop the economy through government spending on public works, manufacturing
technology and consumer incentives.40 Lawrence Peskin’s Manufacturing Revolution
most thoroughly analyzes how a number of these factors fostered industrialization in the
early republic. Manufacturing promoters stressed the harmony of manufactures with
commerce and agriculture, therefore making them seem a natural and unthreatening
addition to the economic sector. Most importantly, however, Peskin’s argument lends
credence to arguments which emphasize the importance of the cultural backgrounds
stimulating both the economy and manufactures in particular. The key to the market and
industrial revolutions, and the enthusiasm for economic growth, was less the new
technologies and transportations that expanded market transactions, but rather “a series of
decisions made by individuals yearning to become part of the larger markets as
consumers and producers.”41 The desires and actions of individual producers and
consumers were ultimately responsible for demonstrating the necessity of manufactures
and making them an essential part of the early American economy.
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As previously noted, E.I. du Pont was one individual who did much to promote
manufactures and stress their importance for an independent economy and for national
development. Early in his company’s tenure, he often did this through correspondence
with family members and influential figures and through the promotion of his own
products. Later, he toiled to defend individual rights to innovation, and vigilantly
opposed labor piracy and industrial espionage—which he believed harmed honest and
skilled manufacturers. In his writings and actions, he constantly linked the success of
quality manufactures, like his own, to national development and the public good. Though
from France, and not the United States, du Pont shared the country’s distaste for
England—and its economic dominance—and, furthermore he adapted quickly to
America’s productive mindset. He became committed to the importance of capital in the
establishment of manufactures and in its use for national development and the public
good. Though an immigrant, he was an essential part of America’s industrial
development. Upon settling in the country, he seemed entirely in tune with the words of
his father who wrote, “A great capital is needed to accomplish all the good that can be
done—to reach every family and make it profitable to itself and helpful to others.”42 By
earning a great capital, he, and other producers like him, could aid American
development while advancing independence and the public good in the new nation.
Once the DuPont Company erected its mills and began delivering powder, E.I. du
Pont advertised his manufacture and its product as an essential contributor to economic
development. Commodities are never simply material entities; they must be assigned a
cultural value based on relative scarcity and desirability. The demand for most
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commodities can therefore be manipulated by consumer perceptions and advertising.
Because of this, du Pont’s promotional language reveals how he turned his gunpowder
into a sought after commodity. He did so by depicting domestic manufactures, like his
own, as useful industries important to the nation’s identity. He sought to capitalize on
sentiments of national strength and pride by suggesting that domestic products were not
only better, but they helped reinforce economic stability and material independence as
well. A company advertisement in New York State championed DuPont powder as
superior “in point of strength, quickness, and cleanness” to the best imported powders. It
then linked the quality of home manufactures to national identity in suggesting that “to
every true American it must be a satisfactory prospect to see some of the home
manufactures already superior to those of the old world.”43 Another advertisement, this
one composed by a company agent in Philadelphia, Archibald McCall, also noted the
powder’s domestic origins and compared it favorably to European brands.44 The
company, and E.I. du Pont in his private correspondence, continued to use this type of
laudatory language when promoting its powder and manufactures in general.
Aside from his own manufacture, E.I. du Pont wrote increasingly about the
significance of manufacturing for national strength and prosperity. In an 1808 letter, du
Pont encouraged prominent Philadelphian James Mease’s idea to publish a periodical on
agriculture, art, and manufacturing. The work would be highly useful, du Pont asserted,
being “fully convinced that the country is more ripe for manufacturing than people
generally think.”45 In his mind, a work like Mease’s would further encourage industry.
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Also, between 1808 and 1810, du Pont endeavored to bolster the number of merino
sheep—a famous Spanish breed—in America and use their wool to start a cloth
manufactory run by his brother Victor. The merino’s fine wool, du Pont reasoned, would
not only give his own company a great advantage but would also benefit the entire
country. Cloth manufactures could compete directly with the English trade, potentially
damage their commerce, and strengthen America’s economic independence.46 It was
again on the subject of merino sheep, and specifically a desire to secure their passage to
the United States, that du Pont wrote to departing president Thomas Jefferson about the
country’s growing interest in manufactures. “The establishment of manufactures upon
which every eye almost seems to be turned in the present moment,” du Pont wrote, was
“a matter of the first magnitude for the prosperity and independence of [America].”47
Once more wealth and prosperity were evoked. For du Pont and some others writing at
the time, manufactures were an absolutely essential part of the growing nation’s
economy, freedom, and longevity.
E.I. du Pont’s efforts to promote manufactures and connect them to national
prosperity, independence, and development offer an example of how individuals acted to
establish industries and ensure their growth. Others joined du Pont in equating
manufactures with national prosperity. An 1810 column in the Weekly Aurora, borrowing
from news venues around the country, observed that “It is becoming an axiom with our
wisest politicians, that the expansion of American manufactures is essential to our
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national independence.”48 Swept by the same “merino mania” that motivated du Pont,
agriculturalists and manufactures were both included in this prosperous vision. Wool was
perhaps a perfect item to rally around as it offered potential benefits to multiple economic
sectors. In Boston, the arrival of merino sheep gave both farmers and industrialists “an
opportunity which may never again occur.”49 Overall, it was not just manufactures but an
industrious spirit and “producer critique” in the words of Lawrence Peskin that pushed du
Pont and others to advocate support for manufactures and tie their growth to national
prosperity.50 As du Pont firmly explained, “Every day’s work of adding the value of
industry to the cost of raw material creates a new value incomparably surer than the
profits of commerce.”51 These arguments, equating industry with national prosperity,
were used to both justify economic growth and, if their language is taken at face value, to
drive further innovation and compel other producers to participate in a burgeoning field
of exchange.

Piracy and Legitimacy
As an actual manufacture busy fashioning commodities from raw materials, the
DuPont Company faced a number of challenges that help illuminate the difficulty of
establishing industries in the early United States. Manufacturers in antebellum America
faced a number of specific issues concerning the promotion of their products and defense
of their nascent industries. As national marketplaces rapidly emerged and the spread of
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news and knowledge increased, producers entered emerging marketplaces where they
faced a variety of competition.
Ironically, as “free” exchange and forms of transparency became staples for markets,
so too did industrial protection, secrecy, and violent competition. Though patents and
copyright systems were in place thanks to the Constitution’s intellectual property
clause—Article One, Section Eight—manufactures and inventors still responded in new
ways to ward off espionage and piracy. E.I. du Pont specifically faced challenges to his
creative control and intellectual property from both outside and within his company. In a
time when the Embargo of 1807 and the War of 1812 stimulated inventive activity due to
a paucity of raw materials and supplies from abroad, and in the period of economic
contraction that followed the war’s end, E.I. du Pont and other manufactures had to ward
off threats and challenges to their businesses and ensure that manufactures remained a
viable and important part of the new economy.52
Since skilled workers were scarce and labor generally expensive in the new nation,
finding dedicated and trustworthy workers was an important step for new manufactures.
One of the first tasks E.I. du Pont set himself to, after choosing a site for his manufacture,
was finding skilled employees. Initially, he wrote to acquaintances in France hoping they
might send him some workmen. French workers would be valuable to him as they were
culturally familiar and would provide stability—as opposed to American workers who
developed a sense of independence resulting from the high price of labor.53 This seems to
belie du Pont’s commitment to national development, and in a way it does. His
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uneasiness as a new immigrant during his first few years in America often made him
wary of those around him while simultaneously hoping to contribute to their national
well-being, and thereby asserting his place as a citizen. Yet, even after acquiring a head
workman from France, du Pont was reluctant to trust a fellow countryman. This piece of
evidence favors the notion that du Pont was more worried about his own well-being than
the country’s in general. To argue the reverse, however, du Pont’s fear of saboteurs in the
workplace and employee betrayal attests to the unique skills and abilities he believed he
offered the country. This ambiguity can be observed in his later efforts to import foreign
laborers—rather than employing Americans—and yet offer them housing, accident
insurance, and a healthy environment for their families.
One example in particular speaks to du Pont’s strong desire to safeguard his talents
and knowledge. Before arriving at the Eleutherian Mills, Charles F. Parent, a French
powder worker who agreed to venture to America and work for the DuPont Company,
was made to sign an agreement with his new employers. This agreement ensured that
once Parent’s contract with the company expired, he could not “work in America either
personally or by giving information to any other powder manufactory.”54 But, early in his
tenure Parent’s behavior increasingly worried du Pont. Parent was miserable in America,
and generally seemed disinterested in the company. To avoid the possibility that he might
share valuable information with others out of frustration with his employers, E.I. du Pont
had Parent briefly jailed before providing him with the capital to open his own mills in
New Orleans where he would be far enough away from the company to no longer pose a
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threat.55 Du Pont’s handling of the Parent situation underscores the apprehension that his
ideas and methods might be utilized by others. This fear was magnified because du Pont
believed himself a unique producer in America. His anxiety is, therefore, ultimately
interesting because, whereas many of his ideas, methods, and equipment came from
France, it was the quintessential threat that Parent, another Frenchman, might compete
with him in the marketplace. To avoid this, du Pont essentially shut Parent up, before
neutralizing his threat and shipping him away entirely.
Another example, highlighting the threat of labor piracy and du Pont’s efforts to
combat it, occurred in early 1809. In this case, a man named Charles Munns who
represented a group in Richmond, Virginia that hoped to open a rival powder mill opened
communications with several du Pont workmen at a neighboring inn and attempted to
lure them away from the company. Since workers held “special knowledge” of company
procedures and equipment, they posed a considerable threat to the company if they were
won over by others.56 When Munns was discovered, he fled to Philadelphia where E.I. du
Pont caught up with him, gave him a “thrashing,” and had him thrown into jail. In a letter
to his father, du Pont expressed that this affair was a very good one, because now, “no
one [would] come for a long time to meddle with [their] affairs or to make trouble in
[their] mills.”57 Several years after this occurred, Munns sued du Pont for abuse. In a
decision labeled “Important to Manufactures,” the jury found du Pont not guilty, and
believed he had probable cause in his accusations against Munns, as well as in his
treatment toward him. (In a prior verdict, du Pont had been fined fifteen dollars for the
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assault against Munns).58 What is important here is that once again du Pont’s behavior in
maintaining secrecy and keeping strangers outside of his mills was ruled justifiable.
A separate situation, occurring only slightly after the Munns case, saw a different
individual attempt to infiltrate the DuPont Company mills. In this instance, a Dr. Thomas
Ewell, who desired to open a gunpowder mill near Washington, reached out to E.I. du
Pont to join him in the endeavor. Though the exchange began cordially, Ewell grew
frustrated when du Pont declined joining him and refused to assist him by not providing
skilled laborers and production methods. Ewell’s subsequent threats prompted du Pont to
publish a pamphlet titled “Villany Detected” that chronicled their exchange. Du Pont
called the credentials of Ewell into question and projected himself as the legitimate
producer. Ewell’s attempts to seduce DuPont workers with extremely high wages and to
record company machinery in operation further upset du Pont. Ewell was nothing but a
charlatan, he charged, or “another eccentric adventurer,” who “thought he might at once
become a great manufacturer.”59
But Ewell’s actions and those by others who engaged in labor piracy and industrial
espionage posed serious risks to honest producers according to du Pont, and he set out to
justify himself to the public. He explained that the knowledge and skill gained by the
company over time was private property on which the company’s survival depended.60
That Ewell’s enterprise did not succeed suggests perhaps that du Pont’s pamphlet was
effective, or at the very least that he was correct in his assessment of Ewell’s acumen and
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that the man possessed little or none of the skills du Pont believed his firm offered.
Furthermore, just slightly before this encounter, the state of Delaware passed a law firmly
supporting du Pont’s arguments. In 1811, the state legislature passed a law to encourage
the establishment of manufactures within the state. Section Four of the law specifically
addresses the problems du Pont faced by instituting a fine on anyone that “shall contract
with, entice, or persuade or endeavor to seduce or encourage any artificer or workman.”61
A victory for du Pont, he believed this law legitimized his production and criminalized
those who threatened the security and survival of what he recognized as his efforts to
maintain an “honest” manufacture.62
The main point here is that manufactures were often new and fragile endeavors that
needed the efforts of individuals, and appeals to the larger community, to persevere
through the early republic’s changing economic climate. When in 1804 E.I. du Pont
applied to the Secretary of State for a fourteen-year patent on his new graining machine
that “proved a perfect success,” he did so as the market for his business was starting to
grow.63 For du Pont, receiving this patent was an “ample reward for the pains that [he
had] taken,” to obtain a strong reputation for his powder.64 Similarly, as others hoped to
duplicate his success, he had to fight off competitors and “pirates” that sought to steal
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ideas, machinery, and his employees. That his actions, according to one author, helped
secure the Delaware legislature’s passage of the 1811 law encouraging manufactures can
be understood as a success for a certain type of production.65 This law, and others
including extended patents, copyrights, and trademarks, ensured that “honest” producers
or legitimized industries would receive protection going forward and that pirating labor
and stealing secrets was equitable to the theft or appropriation of one’s private property.
Du Pont’s actions were vindicated by the Munns case and through the Delaware
legislature’s new law. They also helped ensure, that at least for the time being, certain
forms of industrial protection and security were necessary for the development of new
manufactures, and that their survival required that government policy and action secure
for them the room to grow and succeed.
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CHAPTER 2
DUPONT AND AMERICA’S EARLY ECONOMIC FRONTIER
“Too Big to Fail?”
In November of 2008, General Motors’ chairman Rick Wagoner made a public plea
for federal funding to save the sinking company. Saddled with plummeting shares and the
impending reality of bankruptcy, Wagoner stressed the urgency of immediate assistance.
At stake was the livelihood of subsidiary industries, communities, and thousands of
workers who depended on the company for survival.1 This plight was not General
Motors’ alone however, as several prominent financial institutions appealed for federal
dollars in the closing months of 2008 and early 2009. During that period, nine large
banks, including Bank of America and Citigroup, automakers, and federal lending
programs became the targeted recipients of seven billion dollars in federal bailout
money.2 The pretense that these institutions and industries were “too big to fail”
putatively justified the awarding of this substantial financial package. The sum’s
subsequent dispersal among its numerous beneficiaries generated debate over which
groups were deserving of this money, prompting one journalist to ask “What does it
actually mean for an institution to be ‘too big to fail?’”3
Nearly two centuries earlier, a group of Delaware industrialists gathered together to
also appeal for a type of federal aid. Calling themselves the Society of the State of
Delaware for the Promotion of American Manufactures, they petitioned Congress to
support their fledgling enterprises. American manufacturing establishments were rapidly
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declining they argued, and foreign manufacturers were threatening to overstock markets
and crush domestic competition.4 Like General Motors’ Wagoner, they equated their
welfare with the country’s at large. Their prosperity funded public and private
improvements, employed idle hands, and encouraged the immigration of skilled laborers.
If their manufactories were not supported, “it is impossible to conjecture when (if ever)
they [could] be reasonably expected to recover.”5
Though the historical circumstance and scale of these cases are considerably
different—the sheer magnitude and range of people tied to the failing twenty-first century
financial institutions could not be equaled by America’s entire population in the early
nineteenth century—the proposed solution was similar. While both groups demanded
government assistance, only one was under the pretense that they were too big to fail. In
nineteenth-century Delaware, manufacturers pleading for federal assistance were instead
too fragile to survive without it. The scale of aid and the desired support significantly
differed. While twenty-first century institutions begged for direct financial assistance in
the form of federal money, nineteenth-century manufacturers beseeched the government
for policies favoring domestic industries. Specifically, they desired the passage of
mercantilist policies including: the establishment of a permanent tariff, a revision of
Revenue Laws designed to ascertain the actual value of imported goods, and the repeal of
drawbacks—a tax placed on the re-exportation of foreign goods—placed on gunpowder
and other productions.6 These policies aimed to ensure equal competition between
domestic and foreign producers and therefore differ from the monetary bailout desired by
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twenty-first century businesses and financial institutions. The public advantage to aiding
these industries was considered apparent. Depicted in nationalistic terms, the prosperity
of domestic manufactures was “a positive creation of so much wealth to the country,” and
to neglect their upkeep was not unlike leaving “a farm uncultivated, or a mine
unwrought.”7 The need for federal assistance in both situations was tied to the vitality of
communities, states, and the entire nation. To let these industries fail, in other words,
would hinder local and national development.
Whether these manufactures were as important as they claimed is a topic for
historical investigation, but this conception must have originated somewhere. Published
in Wilmington, the industries referred to by the Society were largely located along the
Brandywine and Christina Rivers in northern Delaware [see Figure 2]. The rivers’ access
to the sea, abundant water power, and proximity to urban centers and rural hinterlands
made them ideal for the establishment of water powered mills for manufacturing.8 Did
these natural advantages facilitate business relationships and allow manufacturers to
connect with a greater network of markets? Or was it the extensive scale and production
of essential manufactures such as cotton, wool, paper, and iron that convinced the
Society’s members of the importance of their survival? Presumably it was both.9
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Figure 2: Map depicting the Brandywine and Christina Rivers, Wilmington, Delaware,
and their proximity to Philadelphia. Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Christina_brandywine.png (Accessed on November 30,
2009).


In the Society’s petition to Congress, they noted that several industries were laboring
under difficulties and in need of government support. One of these industries was E.I. du
Pont’s gunpowder manufactory along the Brandywine. In addition to being a staunch
promoter of domestic manufactures, du Pont was also the Society’s President. During the
war of 1812 the company’s sales increased from $86,000 (in 1810) to $292,000 (in 1814)
at the height of the war.10 After the war’s end, company sales declined (though on
average they never dropped to pre-war levels). It was in these transitioning post-war
years that E.I. du Pont and the rest of The Society of the State of Delaware for the
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Promotion of American Manufactures petitioned the government for aid.
To understand the Society’s perception that their manufactures were too important to
fail, DuPont presents an illuminating case study. The DuPont Company illustrates the
interconnectedness of early American enterprises and the importance of urban, rural, and
federal assistance in the growth of industry. Its early acquisition of federal support and its
use of company agents created an economic network binding the company’s welfare to
institutions and individuals across the new nation. Additionally, public and private
customers came to rely on DuPont’s high quality powder for numerous endeavors—
fueling the company’s growth and status. With the completion of the Eleutherian Mills
along the Brandywine, the DuPont Company quickly generated a wide-ranging clientele
in neighboring cities and rural settlements. From the outset, they also received
encouragement and contracts from the federal government. Their local investments,
governmental relationships, and economic interconnectedness throughout the growing
nation—in the company’s relatively short existence—combined to convince E. I. du Pont
in 1817 that it was in the government’s best interest to pass legislation ensuring the
survival of his enterprise, as well as others in Delaware.
A great deal of research has documented the DuPont Company’s early history. Much
of it deals with the company’s establishment and initial struggles while painting a
detailed portrait of its internal activity. Historians often neglect DuPont’s place in the
emerging national economy. To remedy this, the current study utilizes the company’s
early business records and correspondence primarily with federal officials and agents
engaged in buying, selling, and promoting DuPont powder. These agents resided in port
cities and rural settlements and were charged with disposing and transporting the

40



company’s gunpowder, tying them to a national and international trading network.11
Though using familiar source material from DuPont’s records, this vantage point allows
for an external view of the company’s dealings by focusing on demand for its products
from individuals, agents, and government officials. The company’s employment of
agents in cities and towns throughout the country bound their fortune to local and
regional marketplaces. Concurrently, federal officials, agents, and retail customers came
to rely on DuPont powder, connecting them to the mills along the Brandywine. This
combined public and private reliance convinced the company of its importance, and the
dangers associated with failure. Furthermore, their far-reaching business network
motivated E. I. du Pont’s request for federal aid on the grounds that his manufactory and
others like it were essential to the country’s development and welfare. Beginning with the
company’s emerging relations with federal officials and venturing into their use of agents
in cities and regional markets, this study illustrates the interconnected role of
manufactures in the early national economy, and highlights their growing importance on
the development of places.
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Figure 3: An 1822 map depicting the location of the Eleutherian Mills, DuPont's first
powder mills, along the Brandywine River. The additional plots represent other milling
sites including those constructed by DuPont. Source: Norman Wilkinson, "Brandywine
Borrowings from European Technology” Technology and Culture, No. 1 (Winter, 1963).


“This Feeling of Deep Interest for your Country”:
DuPont and Federal Support
Before immigrating to the United States, the du Pont family established personal
relationships with a number of prominent Americans. These early relations initiated
lasting communication with the American government that directly benefitted the
Company’s founding. Serving as Minister to the Court of Louis XVI prior to the French
Revolution, Pierre Samuel du Pont, E.I.’s father, made the acquaintance of Thomas
Jefferson, who was serving as an American foreign minster in France. The two men
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became comrades in support of free-trade and their admiration for one another continued
until du Pont’s death.12 When P.S. du Pont arrived in America, he brought his son’s
desire to open a powder manufactory to Jefferson’s attention. In an 1800 letter to
Jefferson, du Pont boldly asserted that powder was “indispensable to the defense of
nations,” and that his son’s would “send bullets a fifth farther than English or Dutch
bullets travel.” The letter concludes by appealing to Jefferson not to grant a government
contract for powder before testing DuPont’s. 13 A year later, in another letter to Jefferson,
du Pont rightly predicted that their powder would be needed for both national defense in
the prevention of war, and in the business of the country—consisting of hunting, the
opening of mountains and canals, and for public works.14 According to du Pont, his son’s
powder was an essential investment for Jefferson’s government, assuring defense and
development, two necessities for the growing nation.
Jefferson either agreed with du Pont or decided to appease his old friend, because he
met with Pierre Samuel’s son E.I. du Pont and encouraged him to open his proposed
gunpowder mill. It is unclear if the du Ponts would have been convinced of their eventual
success without assurances of government support. As the building of the powder mills
ensued, Jefferson boosted E.I.’s confidence further by telling him that the United States
Army and Navy had been informed to purchase DuPont powders “whenever their wants
may call for them.”15 These statements encouraged E.I. that the government would
provide stable business and support for his enterprise.
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Figure 4: The 1801 meeting between E.I. du Pont and Thomas Jefferson, where Jefferson
is said to have encouraged du Pont to establish a gunpowder manufactory. Image Source:
DuPont: From the Banks of the Brandywine to the Miracles of Science (Wilmington: E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Company, 2002), 2.


In the DuPont Company’s early years, the government acted as a supplier of raw
materials for the production of gunpowder, and as a stable customer and promoter of the
enterprise. By purchasing powder or sending business elsewhere, the government tied the
company to the developing nation’s welfare and facilitated the dispersal of DuPont
powder throughout the country. This public support for a private endeavor assured the
company of its importance in the growing economy. Furthermore, the federal
government, through its assistance, helped DuPont locate and create a domestic
marketplace for manufactures in the early republic.
In several circumstances, the federal government provided DuPont with all the
necessary materials to manufacture new powder and remanufacture old. The production
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of gunpowder requires three key materials: sulfur, charcoal, and potassium nitrate,
referred to as saltpeter at the time. Saltpeter was the key ingredient, and in the company’s
founding years it was obtainable only from British-controlled India.16 The saltpeter was
sold to governments as a product to be stored for future military needs. For this reason, it
was essential that DuPont establish a relationship with the government to gain access to
this necessary resource. Though it soon found other suppliers of saltpeter, the Company’s
early government contracts relied on saltpeter stored in the Philadelphia Magazine. In
1809, E.I. du Pont’s business partner Peter Bauduy, a French American who invested in
the company, wrote to Callender Irvine, the Superintendent of Military Stores in
Philadelphia, asking if the War Department still planned to furnish DuPont with the
saltpeter necessary for manufacturing fifty-thousand pounds of powder.17
During these years federal officials also asked the company to judge samples of
saltpeter from domestic sources to ascertain whether it could be used in powder
production. Writing to the Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, E.I. du Pont noted that a
sample of Kentucky saltpeter that he had been sent was “very fine and pure.” He closed
this communication by asserting that he had “no doubt that Kentucky and the upper parts
of Louisiana will offer the United States great resources in Saltpeter if [its] importation
[received] any encouragement.”18 This letter is important for two reasons. First it depicts
the company’s and the government’s desire to find domestic sources of saltpeter, and
their dependence on one another in doing so. And secondly, it was written within two
years of the Louisiana Purchase, and can be read as an entrepreneurial endorsement of
western exploration and settlement. In locating this mutually important resource, the


16

Kinnane, 12.
Peter Bauduy to Callender Irvine, May 1809.
18
E.I. du Pont to Henry Dearborn, March 14 1805.
17

45



company and the government both supported its marketability. Furthermore, this
highlights the role that private industry played in encouraging public action—realized
here through the development of western markets.
From the moment DuPont opened its mills in 1804 the company tirelessly advertised
their manufactory to federal officials and promoted their mutual interests. In a March,
1805 letter to Secretary of War Dearborn, E.I. du Pont announced that the company was
ready to receive a government order for the remanufacture of thirty or forty thousand
pounds of old powder. Several of DuPont’s initial government contracts involved the
remanufacture of already existing powder.19 In addition to providing business, jobs of this
nature implied a measure of trust that the company’s end product would produce
beneficial results. In May of the same year, Dearborn arranged for Callender Irvine to
furnish DuPont with twenty-five tons of powder to be remanufactured and instructions on
protecting the finished powder from the elements.20 Dearborn’s satisfaction with DuPont
was evident. In subsequent years, the government ran tests on DuPont powder, sent
additional powder for remanufacture, and even asked the company for charcoal to secure
the state magazine in Philadelphia.21
In its first years of production, DuPont gained a reputation with federal officials who
began to equate its achievements and abilities with its family name. Through
correspondence with Dearborn and Irvine, the company continuously promoted the
superior quality and strength of its powder. In doing so, they tied the federal
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government’s fortune to their own and highlighted the company’s growing importance.
Midway through 1807, E.I. du Pont addressed a letter to General Dearborn lamenting the
company’s inability to oblige a request for both shooting and cannon powder. Attempting
to save face, du Pont promised that the company would “procure some soon and…have
the honor to send it.” Trying to further evade this disappointment, he quickly directed
Dearborn’s attention to a recent test of powder in New York. DuPont powder preformed
admirably and displayed a considerable advantage over imported British and Dutch
powders. His product’s clear superiority prompted du Pont to proclaim that “we have
always found [our own powder] stronger than any one of the same description imported
in this country.”22 Months later, again writing to Dearborn, du Pont expressed frustration
at prejudices directed against his company. Believing these judgments were negatively
affecting the company’s reputation, du Pont cautioned that “if the government thinks it
can procure for itself better powder we certainly cannot complain of it, but we dare say
that better powder is not to be found either in America or in Europe.”23 He further
indicated that attacks against the company disadvantaged them and the government. It
would be better for both parties, du Pont reasoned, for the government to place more
confidence in his manufacture. As far as he was concerned, they benefitted in the
purchase of DuPont powder as much as the company profited from selling it. Increasing
orders for new and remanufactured powder must have validated du Pont’s reasoning and
his consistent assertions of his powder’s superiority.24
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Another striking example of the government’s trust in and use of DuPont powder
came in their willingness to employ it in diplomacy. In 1807, General John Mason, the
nation’s Superintendant of Indian Trade, asked DuPont for samples of their powder to
send to several Indian tribes. The Indians were “good judges of the article” according to
Mason, and it was his official objective to “serve them faithfully and well.” Mason
believed DuPont powder would please the Indians and he placed an order for “forty
quarter casks of [their] best rifle powder.”25 He assured DuPont, that if they agreed to
supply powder for native tribes, they would be called upon to do so often. This assurance
of future business was a direct result of the Company’s expanding relationship with the
federal government. Once again, DuPont facilitated federal business and profited from it.
Their growing importance as a supplier of elite powder boosted their reputation and
secured federal support that would only increase during the War of 1812.
The timing of the company’s foundation was ideal as the United States benefited
from an extended period of economic growth during the 1790s until the Embargo in
1807. Additionally, it was also fortuitous timing for a manufacture of military supplies.
Though one historian notes that this period witnessed a disruption in the close association
between economic and military might, DuPont may have been the exception.26 In 1805,
the United States Government tested DuPont powder and found it superior to both
domestic and English-made powders. This caused Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to
announce in a public statement that, in the future, DuPont would receive all the
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government’s business.27 E. I. du Pont’s enthusiasm over this statement was probably
tempered by the reality that “between 1805 and 1809 Government purchases from
[DuPont] amounted to less than $30,000 of a total of approximately $244,000” the
company took in.28 Regardless, the government’s endorsement certainly helped DuPont
obtain a quick reputation and credibility that was crucial to its early business networking
and growth. The government proved its loyalty in the War of 1812 when it relied heavily
on the company’s powder and more than doubled their production (and sales).29
Economic policy at the national level also assisted the DuPont Company in its
founding years. Political attitudes began to shift in the new nation as Jefferson’s
Republican Party assumed leadership of the Executive and Legislature. As one historian
notes, and this analysis of DuPont helps confirm, in the years leading to the War of 1812
the Republican and Federalist Parties appeared to switch positions on the issue of
manufacturing and the role of the federal government in the economy.30 Long understood
as champions of agrarianism and the self-sufficient yeoman farmers, historians have
recently highlighted Republican efforts to promote the productivity of both agriculture
and manufactures.31 After taking office, the new Republican administration appeased
manufacturers by repealing an excise tax placed on them and by prohibiting the
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importation of several important British goods.32 These policies, as well as the Embargo
of 1807, directly supported domestic manufacturers and aided their nascent development.
Though powder was not specified as one of these British productions, this favorable
attitude toward manufacturers created an environment where new enterprises could
survive and flourish. The DuPont Company, one of many new manufactures opening for
business in the first decade of the nineteenth century, benefitted from federal patronage
and policies.
It was certainly the case that the federal government was beginning to rely on the
DuPont Company for its powder needs. The company however, equally relied on the
government’s business. Location played a role in this mutual reliance. Dearborn and
Irvine, two primary government correspondents in the Company’s early years, resided in
the federal capital, Washington D.C., and the nation’s previous capital and current
corporate center, Philadelphia, respectively. The DuPont powder mills were just over one
hundred miles from Washington and a mere thirty-five miles or so from Philadelphia.
Furthermore, Baltimore, a growing eastern port and population center was positioned
between Washington and Wilmington, a short seventy miles away. In the census of 1810,
Delaware was listed behind Maryland and Pennsylvania as the third largest producer of
gunpowder in the nation.33 This might seem insignificant except for the fact that DuPont
was the only manufacturer in Delaware, whereas the leading states had nine and twenty
producers respectively. Located between these other producers and in close proximity to
several developing urban centers, DuPont used the federal government’s assistance to
create and sustain a market for its powder.
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Two other factors, however, were of great importance in the DuPont Company’s
initial growth and networking. Its relationship with the government grew more intimate
as the two increasingly relied on one another. Additionally, recognition of the superiority
of DuPont powder traveled quickly and new customers sought to acquire it. This section
has provided an account of the Company’s relationship with the federal government, and
how DuPont gathered sales and support from Republican officials. The next section
considers how the company’s use of agents allowed them to create an economic network
that disseminated their powder across the national landscape.

“To Send Them by Way of”: The Creation
of Powder Markets
In their founding years, the DuPont Company employed and increasingly gained new
powder agents to sell and distribute their product across the American landscape.
Concurrently, during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, other industrial and
business networks were forming, connecting manufacturers, laborers, and goods with one
another and the growing nation. Writing about the rise of machinist networks in the early
republic, David Meyer describes them as “unifying mechanisms” where technical and
market knowledge connected individuals and firms.34 The DuPont Company created a
similar network that connected their industry to individuals across the national landscape.
Their system relied on the buying and selling of goods, rather than the exchange of
knowledge and skill. The company, utilizing their adjacency to several urban centers,
assembled a number of agents in developing cities and towns that acted as entrepôts and
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salesmen of DuPont powder. These agents actively created markets in their regions and
communicated local demands back to the company. With a growing reputation,
government patronage, and on-the-ground local agents, the company’s product quickly
spread across America’s republican landscape. Not limited to a local marketplace, the
company benefitted from geographic advantages and successfully expanded their sales
and distribution to the mid-Atlantic region and greater eastern states. By establishing this
interconnected business network, the company linked its stability to local economies
throughout the nation. As their network expanded, and people and places increasingly
relied on their powder, DuPont solidified its importance as an essential manufacturer in
the early American economy.
Laboring to complete construction of their powder mills in the first years of the
nineteenth century, DuPont actively searched out and created private markets through
which to sell their powder. By placing sales agents throughout the country, the company
amplified demand for their powder and positioned themselves to build markets in urban
and rural locations. Meyer has observed that local economies shifted from an internal
focus to greater market integration during the 1790s and early 1800s. To facilitate the
opening of markets on a national scale, manufacturers producing custom goods began
requiring close contact between buyer and seller.35 To reiterate, DuPont achieved this by
contracting with agents to promote its powder and operate as regional entrepôts in distant
market centers and peripheries. From their Eleutherian Mills site just outside
Wilmington, the company manufactured their product, arranged for its transportation,
loaded it on ships or wagons, and sent it to agents and other customers. Upon receiving
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powder, company agents promoted it, arranged for its sale, and disseminated it through
local markets. Ultimately, these agents supported the company’s expansion and
reputation by creating new, private markets that linked the company to local economies
throughout the nation.
One of the company’s first powder agents was the Baltimore merchant Isaac McKim.
In 1802, E.I. du Pont visited France to collect materials and machinery for building his
powder works. After acquiring the necessary equipment, du Pont forwarded it to
America, specifically to Baltimore, where McKim readily received “three barrels of
machinery” and began making arrangements for its transfer to Wilmington.36 Once
DuPont began manufacturing powder at the Brandywine mill site, McKim wrote to the
company regarding the scarcity of powder in his region. The supply of good gunpowder
was deficient in Baltimore, he stated, and DuPont could expect to find available markets
in the area. “I think there is every appearance of the articles [powder] being in demand
and scarce for sometime to come,” and if the company had available supplies, McKim
was sure he could sell it.37 In this manner the company procured one of its first private
markets for gunpowder. In outlining the favorable conditions for powder sales in the
Baltimore area, McKim secured supplies of DuPont powder and assumed the role of
supplier for the region. Though McKim’s relations with DuPont began before the
completion of the mills, it was not long before the Company established regular
correspondence with other agents across the American landscape.
In another example, the Company created a new market for its powder by acquiring
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an agent in Chestertown, Maryland. In 1804, John Chew wrote to the company that he
received directions from three merchants of the area to procure DuPont powder. If the
powder’s quality was approved, Chew had no doubt that “it [would] be demanded in the
lower part of this peninsula,” and he would aid in selling it.38 Chestertown was located on
Maryland’s eastern peninsula and was accessible by water. From this vantage point a year
later, Chew confirmed what McKim had earlier observed, there existed a scarcity of
British and domestic powder in Maryland. He encouraged DuPont to continue supplying
him, noting that if their powder did not find an immediate market, its sale could be
considerably extended into neighboring counties. In his next letter to the company, Chew
confirmed that he adopted this strategy by sending samples of powder to a village sixteen
miles distant.39 Determined to sell the powder, Chew and other agents acted as peripheral
outlets that the company entrusted to scout out markets and distribute its productions.
Though many of DuPont’s initial agents and correspondents were located relatively
close to Wilmington, in places such as Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Castle, and
Maryland’s eastern peninsula, the company very quickly procured agents throughout the
new nation. Agents such as Boston’s John Hancock utilized the transportation resources
of a large urban center to transfer DuPont powder to more geographically distant
locations. In a letter to the company, Hancock described his ability to export large
quantities of powder should he be provided with it. Furthermore, his location in a port
city like Boston allowed him to receive powder on a steady basis and encourage its
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continued sale.40 Agents in upstate New York created new markets for DuPont powder in
Albany, the growing state capital. When Victor du Pont, E.I.’s brother, passed through
Albany, he secured a new agent in John D.P. Done & Co. Shortly after Victor’s trip,
Done & Co. wrote to DuPont about their desire to keep a supply of powder “for the
Western part of [their] state.”41 In the same letter, they advised that the DuPont Company
could send future supplies through a Captain Marren who provided regular service to
Albany. As in Boston, Albany’s location along a major waterway—in this case the
Hudson River—allowed for consistent communication by water during much of the year.
Cities provided additional opportunities for the sale of powder by luring customers
from outside their borders. In several cases, existing markets within growing urban
centers facilitated the opening of neighboring markets. In Rhode Island, where two cities
competed for prominence, the appearance of DuPont powder in Newport fostered
demand for an agent in nearby Providence. In 1805, Asa Ames rode thirty miles to
Newport to purchase powder from a DuPont agent there. Writing to the company, he
noted the necessity of undertaking this hardship because there was no agent currently
serving his own city.42 To remedy this, Ames recommended several trusted merchants
who could carry DuPont powder to Providence, where he would gladly purchase it. By
illustrating this scenario, Ames highlights the role cities played in housing merchants and
attracting customers from surrounding regions. Furthermore, through his merchant
recommendations Ames acted as a local representative for the company and facilitated
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the creation of a new market in Providence. Less than a year later, John Whipple became
DuPont’s powder agent in Providence, and wrote to the company that sales were “beyond
what [he] could have expected” despite regional prejudices against domestic powders.43
This last example also illustrates how DuPont powder helped American’s lose their sense
of industrial inferiority. By learning to trust and purchase domestic products—such as
DuPont’s—over foreign ones, American’s began shifting their allegiance to their own
manufactures, and in doing so they directly supported the growth of a national economy.
Agents served an equally important role in emerging settlements and peripheral
country regions. In Reading and Pittsburgh, two developing centers in rural Pennsylvania
that organized western trade and supplied settlers and farmers, DuPont agents sent
samples of and sold company powder to neighboring regions. In November of 1805,
George Kein petitioned the company to serve as its lone agent in Reading. “I have sent
samples of your powder to my friends of the country,” he conveyed in a letter to the
company. Shortly after, Kein became Readings’ sole powder agent, and endeavored to
sell the quantity he had received.44 A similar situation transpired a year earlier when
DuPont obtained Joseph Barker as its agent in the emerging city of Pittsburgh. After
receiving a stock of the company’s powder, Barker sent samples to merchants in adjacent
towns from twenty to fifty miles away.45 In doing so, he not only established a
distribution center for DuPont powder in a relatively peripheral settlement, he also sought
out new customers in even more remote areas. By gathering agents in smaller
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settlements, the company established new markets and dispersed its powder outside the
reach and realm of traditional urban centers like Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.
Correspondence between the company and Mitchell and Sheppard, one of its
principal agents in Baltimore, illustrates the process by which agents secured new
markets and distributed DuPont powder. In March of 1805, Mitchell and Sheppard sold
forty-four casks—the standard shipping container—of DuPont powder to three
customers. The casks were divided accordingly: twenty-two went to an S. Shaulding,
eleven to an A. Richardson, and eleven to a Robert Hough. These three buyers, as
Mitchell and Sheppard indicated, were “considerable dealers in the article,” and if the
powder met their approbation, could be counted on for future orders.46 This letter depicts
the extensive network DuPont powder traveled across before arriving in a final
destination for use. After leaving the company’s mills, powder transferred to the hands of
agents who sold it to customers who often resided a considerable distance from the
agent’s establishment, and in many cases, these customers distributed the powder
elsewhere or to customers of their own. Rather than being shipped to a single location for
a specific use, DuPont powder was disseminated across the developing nation by agents
working in urban centers and rural settlements.
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Producer: E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company (Wilmington, DE)
Agent: Mitchell and Sheppard (Baltimore, MD)
Dealers: S. Shaulding(22) A. Richardson(11) Robert Hough(11)

Figure 5: Representing the diffusion of DuPont powder through several intermediaries.
Beginning with the company, the powder was shipped to agents who then sold it to
powder dealers for further sales.


DuPont’s growing network of agents and sales, combined with a burgeoning demand
for their powder, solidified the company’s importance in the national economy. With
established markets throughout the eastern coast and countryside, customers began
relying on DuPont powder for a number of uses as agents profited from its sale. As the
company developed, the number of agents selling its powder increased, and new markets
sustained new customers. Rapidly, the DuPont manufactory became a stable and reliable
source for quality domestic powder throughout the country. To do so, the company
utilized urban services for transportation and communication. One historian, describing
the urbanization of Philadelphia and Delaware, categorizes Wilmington as a processing
town, a transport town, and at times an organizer of trade and commerce.47 For the
DuPont Company, the city served all these needs. Once the powder left the Wilmington
area however, agents carried and sold it in a variety of places including cities and
emerging settlements. The company’s strong presence in America’s early economy
convinced them, and others, of the potential for and necessity of domestic manufacturers.
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Frontiers and Development
As they often do today, industrialists in the nineteenth century actively created and
discovered new markets for their products and utilized government support in
establishing and maintaining success. Though the scale of modern industry differs
quantitatively from the nineteenth century’s, early manufacturers still could justifiably
argue the private and public value of their survival. After all, the company’s powder was
utilized for national defense, diplomatic relations, and eventually in western migration
and development. The market revolution that historians recognize as emerging after the
War of 1812 was developing at least a decade earlier in some important ways such as the
growth of domestic markets and industrial production.48 By linking their interests with
the federal government’s and employing agents to disseminate their powder to remote
regions, the DuPont Company created institutional networks. The number of agents they
employed rose steadily in the first several years of production as demand increased and
they provided for new markets. Though production and sales dropped after the War of
1812, the company was already established enough to compose a legitimate argument
asserting their importance.
In the summer of 1804, E.I. du Pont was assured of the government’s commitment to
his enterprise, meanwhile his agent in Philadelphia was already scouting markets for
saltpetre.49 In 1813, when the company was inundated with war orders from the
government, rather than appease investors, E.I. du Pont diverted company profits to the



48

For a discussion of the post-1812 market revolution: Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian
America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3-5.
49
Archibald McCall, manuscript invoice to E.I. du Pont, July 21 1804, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood
Manuscript Group 5, Series B, Box 17, HML.

59



construction of a new powder mill site on neighboring land.50 The acquisition of the
Hagley powder yard in 1813 is a testament to the faith E.I. du Pont placed in the
company’s longevity. Not long afterward, as he presided over the Society of the State of
Delaware pleading for government aid, du Pont’s intuition proved correct. The company
continued to survive and prosper, all the while adding to their footprint on the
Brandywine shoreline.
In 1808, E.I. du Pont ventured to rural western Virginia to inquire about available
supplies of saltpetre. In letters of introduction, War Department official John Roberts
asked that du Pont be given “all the aid and assistance” in procuring this resource.51
Occurring while the country was saddled with the Embargo Act of 1807, banning trade
between the United States and other nations, it is clear that du Pont, with the
government’s blessing and support, was searching for alternative supplies. With the
Embargo in place, the company was forced to abandon its traditional English and Indian
sources of this essential raw material and inquire instead about its availability within the
United States. Increasingly, they turned to the west where “vast repositories of [the]
material,” were being discovered and mined in the mountains and caves of Kentucky and
Tennessee [see Figure 6].52 Again, the availability of these resources was made possible
by a growing national state and policies that necessitated the gathering of raw materials
and the development of western mining sites and economies.
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Figure 6: A nineteenth century map depicting the layout and corridors of Kentucky’s
Mammoth Cave, now a national park, owned by Lexington, Kentucky saltpetre dealer
Charles Wilkins. During the early 1800s, and probably beginning after E.I. du Pont
travelled through Kentucky and West Virginia, Wilkins sold saltpetre to the company.
Places like Mammoth Cave were important sources of domestic raw materials.
Additionally, the company’s business, and that of others undoubtedly played a role in the
marketing of these materials and therefore the development of their mining locations. The
details on the map highlight the availability and abundance of saltpetre in this particular
location. One caption reads: “[The cave] has been explored about 7 miles from the
termination of the narrows. The clay impregnated with Nitre has been found to be
generally about 5 feet thick extending quite across the cave. Under this clay is a vast
body of fine dry sand, the depth of which has never been ascertained. The clay in the
principal cave produces 6lbs of saltpetre to every bushel, the sand produces one to the
bushel.” Source: Map, An Eye-Draught of the Mammoth Cave in Warren County [Ky],
n.d., Winterthur Manuscripts, W4-5033.jpg, Hagley Museum and Library.
Intimately connected to the federal government through mutual interests, the DuPont
Company persevered through the financially precarious beginnings of American
industrialization. In subsequent fragile moments, when the company felt compelled to
justify their importance to obtain federal aid, they presented a strong case and referred to
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the creation of an economic network that spanned the entire nation. Additionally, by
supplying government needs the company solidified itself as an important participant in
the early American economy.
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CHAPTER 3
LOCATION AND CREATION: THE MID-ATLANTIC, WILMINGTON,
AND DUPONT’S WORKING ENVIRONMENT
Innovative Spaces and Creating Places
Brilliant ideas, innovations, and technological achievements are often recognized as
the fruit of individual genius inventors, influential industries, or powerful organizations.
Thomas Edison, in particular, is synonymous with invention. The Rockefeller,
Vanderbilt, and Carnegie families are all renowned for industrial power and wealth.
Today, high technology companies such as Apple are noteworthy for the ubiquitous iPod
and iPhone, while others like Google dominate internet email and search technology. The
same notoriety applies to the DuPont Company and family. Their legacy as an American
gunpowder company and international chemical corporation is over two centuries old.
One journalist has referred to the family itself as “unique,” noting that though “a number
of families have been as rich…the du Ponts have conserved their wealth, adding to it
generation after generation.”1 Even the company’s founder, Eleuthère Irénée (E.I.) du
Pont, espoused his ingenuity and skill. Writing to his father during the company’s first
full year of production, he touted that his “powder is not only infinitely better than any
other made in this country, but it is several degrees above that imported from England.”2
But, while it may seem clear that individuals and groups provide the creativity, ingenuity,
and know-how to foster new ideas, products, and companies, it is also revealing to
consider that innovation takes place in certain geographic communities and spaces.
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In a recent blog post previewing his new book, the New York-based journalist Steven
Johnson has analyzed creative places. His Where Good Ideas Come From: The Natural
History of Innovation focuses on the cultural and natural systems that spawn creativity.
For Johnson, this book “tries to grapple with the question of why certain environments
seem to be disproportionately skilled at generating and sharing good ideas.” He offers
several wide-ranging examples, including the information networks of the web, the
Enlightenment-era postal system, public spaces in metropolitan cities, and the notebooks
of great thinkers.3 In his earlier work, The Ghost Map, Johnson provides a more in-depth
and historically specific example of an innovative environment. This work recounts a
deadly cholera outbreak in mid-nineteenth-century London that led to the discovery of
the disease’s waterborne nature.4 In the city’s dense and dirty urban environment, a
neighboring surgeon and a local priest cooperated to locate the epidemic’s original source
in a Broad Street water pump. They did this by creating a map charting the daily patterns
of neighborhood residents and therefore determined that those who died all shared their
water from the same source. For Johnson, John Snow and Henry Whitehead’s triumphant
discovery resulted from their amateurism—as far as their knowledge of cholera was
concerned. They were able to locate the disease’s source through engaged observation
and an “intimate knowledge of the community.”5 London’s enormous size, dense living,
and unique communities brought about the essential variables for a new and innovative
approach to the cholera virus.
Aside from amateur ingenuity, background projects—secondary and tertiary projects
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engaged in to supplement or augment a primary enterprise—also perform a valuable role
in the formation of good ideas. Urban theorist Jane Jacobs has particularly observed the
innovative and economic benefit that come from such projects.6 In The Economy of
Cities, Jacob provides the example of Mrs. Ida Rosenthal, a seamstress from New York
who began manufacturing brassieres. Dissatisfied with the way her custom dresses hung
on customers, Rosenthal “began experimenting with improvements to underclothing and
the result was the first brassiere.” Soon Rosenthal devoted herself to manufacturing,
selling, and distributing brassieres full-time.7 It is assumed from this that the diverse and
dense urban marketplaces of New York City were ideal for the success of this particular
background project. Without a diversified customer base, willing to purchase custom
dresses and concerned about the “right” fit, Rosenthal’s brassiere business would likely
not have grown as it did. Again specific environments, and in these cases, those that
facilitate amateur designs and background projects, are responsible for the eventual
success of new ideas and companies.
Something else, however, can be learned from both Johnson’s and Jacob’s examples.
The individuals and groups who benefit from creative environments also have a role in
shaping those environments. In the examples already mentioned, Snow and Whitehead’s
revelations about cholera helped discredit miasmatists and supported the construction of a
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system of sewer lines and new public health standards, while Rosenthal created a new
industry that undoubtedly generated similar businesses elsewhere and left behind a
physical footprint.8
A number of scholarly works have engaged the ways individuals and groups
constructed urban and economic environments. In America’s early national era
specifically, the period when the DuPont Company emerged and matured, several
historians have analyzed the individual and collective bodies responsible for increased
property values, urban growth, public projects, and entrepreneurial establishments. For
John Lauritz Larson, the years after the American Revolution compelled George
Washington and other founders to promote “internal improvements,” or the building of
canals, roads, highways, and bridges. George Washington in particular, personally
believed the ability to navigate the country’s numerous river systems and waterways was
of the utmost importance. Certainly his desire to “bind the wilderness communities to the
union by chains of commercial interest” was shared by other commercial and
development boosters, at least at the regional or local levels.9 In Philadelphia, a vibrant
culture of coastal merchants and businessmen, before and after the Revolution, not only
developed much of the city’s wharves and waterfronts, but also “[linked] the city’s
hinterland with its overseas market.”10 Similarly, by the 1830s in Philadelphia,
corporations and corporate power influenced the city proper as well as “its contiguous
suburbs and an increasingly populous and productive hinterland stretching from northern
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Delaware to central Pennsylvania.”11 Enterprising individuals, influential “societies”, and
government bodies, all helped construct and shape early America’s environment.12
Scholars have also explicitly equated the ways that environments both help energize
innovation and are themselves the products of innovators and innovations. Geographer
Allan Pred most significantly has explained the phenomena in contemplation here: How
do creative environments influence the individuals that inhabit them? And how do
individuals produce and change spaces through which to exercise their interests and
desires? Pred suggests that the relationship between people and their environments is
dialectical, with individuals acting as both objects and subjects.13 Depicting humans as
creators of their environments, Pred claims that “whether place refers to a village or a
metropolis, an agricultural area or an urban-industrial complex, it always represents a
human product.”14 Yet, humans are also subject to their own territorial creations. This is
most evident in the presence of certain dominant institutions or projects that control
social environments. These dominant projects “usually structure daily paths by taking
time-allocation and scheduling precedence over both other institutional projects and
projects undertaken alone outside of any institutional context.”15 The structures,
institutions, and transportation networks erected by humans, therefore, create a type of
path-dependency that regulates their movements and behaviors and that of others.
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This overview of innovative spaces, environments, and the development of places
relates to the establishment of DuPont’s powder manufactory in the early nineteenth
century: an important part of DuPont’s legacy stems from its construction of a working
and social environment. Today, the Hagley Museum and Library preserves the remnants
of DuPont’s material environment and the techniques of early American powder
production and water-powered milling. Not far away, the family’s Winterthur estate and
Longwood Gardens remain picturesque on the landscape and serve as premier tourist
attractions. Yet, despite E.I. du Pont and his descendants’ innovative thinking, practical
management, and vigorous defense of their business, they could not conjure gunpowder
out of thin air, nor could they succeed in creating a powerful company without the
support and use of the environments around them. Though the location of factories, office
buildings, and homes continues to be important in today’s world, it was critical for new
industries in early America when weather patterns were less discernible, communication
slower, raw material availability was often subject to distant trade, and transportation was
less reliable, available through few outlets and only at certain times of the year.
Additionally, for mills running on waterpower, finding a constant water source and
properly manipulating it to provide energy for several waterwheels made selecting the
right location even more essential.
In analyzing the DuPont Company’s first two decades, it is clear that the family’s
emigration to America and the company’s establishment along the Brandywine facilitated
the development of a strong and lasting powder manufactory and chemical company.
Their contribution toward economic growth and their place within a manufacturing
community resulted both from what they did and where they were. Likeminded industries
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and manufactories occupied the landscape around them and neighboring cities competed
for international and internal trade while cultivating vast hinterlands. Individuals across
the mid-Atlantic and eastern seaboard encouraged the company, offered professional
services, and maintained close friendships. Still the diverse and economically competitive
region where the company chose to locate did not spell success alone. Rather, they had to
vigorously transform and expand their industrial production site, gain capital to further
develop it, and utilize surrounding resources for power, production, and livelihood. In
constructing their “working environment,” the company faced numerous natural and
industrial challenges that threatened to temporarily halt production or end it all together.16
All the while, they developed new manufacturing sites for gunpowder production,
expanded into wool production, raised livestock, and engaged in agricultural pursuits.
Early on, the company created a community for its powder workmen and their families
and during the War of 1812 the du Pont family gathered together a militia and helped
train soldiers to protect their mills and others located along the Brandywine. Industrial
and entrepreneurial growth and environmental development formed in a cyclical
relationship with one another; as the environment stimulated creativity, that creativity
reciprocated by shaping and determining the future environment.
This chapter analyzes the geographical factors that influenced the DuPont Company
and how it simultaneously constructed a working environment during its first two
decades. The first section considers the economic and structural developments occurring
in the Wilmington and mid-Atlantic region. The account further argues that the region’s
geography, built environment, and creative activity offered a model environment for the
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company’s gunpowder manufacture. This was particularly the case due to Wilmington’s
industrial community and quick access to national and international marketplaces. The
second section focuses on the company’s efforts to select an exemplary location for the
manufacture and their construction of a working environment on the site. Again, the two
sections work together to show how environment, development, and activity shape the
nature of new innovations and further constructions. Such developments then proceed to
organize and influence the world around them. In the DuPont Company’s founding years,
Wilmington, Delaware’s geography was fitting for the establishment of new
manufactures, and the city’s entrenched residents actively promoted commerce and
industry. On deciding to settle there, the company and family helped develop the
landscape around the city and became energetic and influential contributors to its
community of producers.

Environment and Society in Wilmington
and the Mid-Atlantic
In the spring of 1802, E.I. du Pont purchased a plot of land adjacent to the
Brandywine Creek a few miles outside the nucleus of Wilmington, Delaware. In short
time, the site became home to both du Pont’s family and his reputable and rapidly
growing gunpowder manufactory. DuPont’s presence along the Brandywine, however,
was not the only development taking place in Delaware or the greater mid-Atlantic region
during this time. Rather, the region—including Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
parts of New York and Virginia—was dynamically growing, changing, and diversifying.
By 1800, population numbers in the region’s key cities, Baltimore, New York, and
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Philadelphia, all surpassed those of any other city in the nation.17 Furthermore, these
cities’ links to their extensive hinterlands tied together a great portion of the United
States’ growing national economy.

Figure 7: Map of the American coast and mid-Atlantic region circa 1813. Depicted are
the states of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and parts of New York and
Virginia. Also included in the lower center is a listing of the populations for the principal
cities along the coast. Wilmington’s population is listed at 4, 416 persons. Source: Map
of the American coast from Lynhaven Bay to Narraganset Bay/ by John Melish; engraved
by H.S Tanner, 1813, Imprints Department, mapAmericanCoast181300001.tif, Hagley
Museum and Library.
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These and other factors influenced E.I. du Pont’s decision to establish his powder
manufactory in New Castle County, Delaware, and they helped shape the company’s
early success. This geography that offered a beneficial and resource rich landscape for the
company’s use, was complemented by a competitive economic culture hopeful of
improving domestic production, markets, communication, and transportation. DuPont’s
beginnings in this time and place energized and secured the company’s fortunes as it
began and strengthened its operations.
In the early nineteenth century, Delaware State, and the city of Wilmington in
particular, quietly expanded in the shadow of Maryland and Pennsylvania, its larger
neighbors. In 1809, Wilmington’s growth required that the city reestablish its charter to
facilitate an increased population and size. The opening words to its new charter
remarked that, the previous document, composed in 1739, “hath from the increased
population of [the] borough…been found incompetent to the good government and wellbeing of the same.”18 Because of its size, Wilmington could no longer rely on old
governing systems. Instead, its urban growth, concentrated between the Brandywine
Creek and Christina River—much the way Philadelphia was situated between the
Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers—hinted at the emergence of a multi-use landscape
attractive to merchants, manufactures, and farmers. One historian suggests that
Wilmington at this moment “was as much a central place as a processing center.”19
Ultimately, due to its geographically advantageous position between two rivers, close
proximity to the much larger Delaware River and Bay, and central location between
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Philadelphia and Baltimore—both larger merchant towns—Wilmington, perhaps
somewhat uniquely for a smaller city, was able to develop a diversified economy and
community as it entered the nineteenth century
Yet, economic diversity aside, Wilmington remained best known for its mills and
manufactures. Unlike neighboring Philadelphia and Baltimore, Wilmington’s economy
was based largely on production and processing. This was the case, in part, because in the
first decades of the nineteenth century, manufactures only existed outside of the country’s
most populous cities. According to Allan Pred, manufacturing was characterized
predominately by “rural dispersion rather than concentration in major urban centers.”20
Pred notes that shortages in capital, technology, transportation, and the cost of labor,
often conspired to situate manufactures outside the city. In addition to these reasons, the
populous cities on America’s eastern seaboard tended not to focus on manufactures
because they had already established themselves as shipping centers and marketplaces.
When manufactures did exist in these cities, they were either of a smaller scale or were
located along the city’s urban edge where waterpower and land was available. In
Wilmington, however, manufacturing grew up alongside the city and therefore became an
intimate part of its development. Once again its location between Philadelphia and
Baltimore meant, especially by the beginning of the nineteenth century, that Wilmington
did not have to be a shipping or trading powerhouse. Rather, its location in between these
two cities secured Wilmington’s role as an essential processor for the immense
hinterlands of other marketplaces and a key networking site between them.
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Figure 8: Wilmington, 1804. Map depicting Wilmington situated between the
Brandywine and Christina Rivers. At the bottom left, the Christina River flows in to the
Delaware River. At the Bridge crossing the Brandywine Creek, in the map’s upper left, is
the location of the Brandywine Mills where the route becomes a road leading to
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In the upper center, Kennet Road leads out of the city and
runs almost parallel to the Brandywine. Adjacent to this road, and four or five miles
outside Wilmington, is the location of DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills. Source: Plan of
Wilmington and its Environs, Wilmington, DE, maps, map1804wilmington09731.tif,
Hagley Museum and Library.
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The availability of waterpower was of additional importance for attracting aspiring
manufacturers and facilitating milling operations in the Wilmington area. In the early
national United States, before the wide use of coal, steam, and oil, water served as the
most reliable energy source for early industrialists. Reliance on water-powered wheels to
operate manufacturing machinery determined where milling communities emerged and
where industrialists could locate production facilities. A modern historian recognized this
while observing that in America, “manufacturing districts were rural and depended upon
the new country’s as yet unexploited resources of water power.”21 Not all manufacturing
districts remained rural, even if they began that way. From its initial establishment,
Wilmington possessed the necessary waterpower, and shortly thereafter the technological
know-how, to fuel the operation of industrial mills.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, numerous authors commented on
Wilmington industrialists’ reliance on the city’s adjacent rivers, and specifically on the
Brandywine Creek’s powerful falls and current. Originating in a large river basin in
Southeastern Pennsylvania, the Brandywine Creek is forty miles long with a threehundred foot decent. For one observer, the river’s features made for “a fine stream…well
adapted to water works.” Furthermore, to fully attest to the Brandywine’s attractiveness
to industrial producers, the same author counted ninety-nine distinct water powered
facilities along the creek, with none extending beyond nine miles from the city.22 Though
manufacturers had to acquire riparian rights to secure this water power, Wilmington’s
location between the Brandywine, Christina, and Delaware rivers ensured there would be
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a great deal of productive space available. Undoubtedly, this played a role in luring new
manufactures to the city and its surrounding environs.
Wilmington’s maturation as a productive city, due in part to its geography, made it an
attractive place for new manufactures to settle. But the city’s culture and past were also
influential in shaping its industrious spirit. In the 1730s, a few enterprising individuals
constructed several of the country’s first merchant mills alongside the Brandywine Creek
just as the city was coming into being. Known simply as the “Brandywine Mills,” this
collection of mostly flour mills gained a national reputation, and according to one author,
contributed greatly to the city’s growth and “kept it from the atrophy that other towns
suffered under the commercial shadow of Philadelphia.”23 Joseph Scott, a contemporary
geographer observing Maryland and Delaware in the early nineteenth century, remarked
that the Brandywine Mills, with the exception of those within the vicinity of Baltimore,
were the most valuable collection of mills in the United States. They consisted of 12 mills
for grinding flour and a single saw mill. Additionally, Scott noticed the mill’s prodigious
production, mentioning that “they grind annually about 300,000 bushels of wheat and
Indian Corn; but if they were constantly supplied with grain, they would grind 400,000
bushels.”24 Based on these remarks, the mills were so efficient as to outpace available
raw materials.
By the time the du Pont’s arrived in Wilmington, they settled in an economically
active place extending beyond the influential presence of the Brandywine Mills. The
city’s proximity to the Brandywine and Christina, as well as its two-mile distance from
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the Delaware River, meant that shipping and transportation also preformed a vital role in
its economy. For the State of Delaware, Wilmington functioned as an important point of
entry and was the only state port that carried on trade with foreign nations.25 The city was
also an important stocking port for vessels traveling from Philadelphia down the
Delaware River.26 The significance of shipping as a livelihood for some Wilmington
citizens is recognizable in their outrage over a 1799 Philadelphia quarantine act. The act
made it mandatory for any incoming ship, bound for the Port of Philadelphia, to first stop
at the Philadelphia Lazaretto before proceeding to unload any of its passengers or cargo.
This created an uproar among Wilmington merchants who argued that Philadelphia,
under cover of protecting itself from infectious disease, was “aiming at a monopoly of the
trade of the Delaware.”27 Their response to the act was economic and political.
Philadelphia’s attempt to govern Delaware’s economy by routing trade through its own
filters was perceived as “inimical to the trade of [Delaware], and a violation both of its
Federal, and Sovereign Rights.” For frustrated Wilmington merchants, “the disguise of a
quarantine law,” did not conceal “the views of commercial interest.”28 With their interests
in jeopardy, the city’s merchant community joined together and resisted their larger and
more influential neighbor. The manifestation of their disagreement in the form of a
petition attests to the act’s potential threat to their interests and those of the city in
general. Though it may metaphorically have stood in Philadelphia’s shadow,
Wilmington’s merchants, along with its manufactures, were instrumental in the city’s
economic stability and growth.
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Together, Wilmington’s manufacturers, merchants, and artisans largely cooperated to
form an economic community and culture motivated to create new and better market
goods and determined to promote the city’s welfare, develop its internal and surrounding
infrastructures, and attract new producers and citizens. The manufacturing community
sought to achieve these goals in part through improvements in new machinery that
promised to enhance productivity through a division of labor that allowed workers to
focus on distinct sections of the production process. Improvements in flour processing
brought on by private investment and inventions along the Brandywine helped strengthen
their already well developed reputation. In 1791, when Oliver Evans introduced his new
automated grist mill—a mill for grinding grain into flour—that was several stories tall
and largely operated without manual labor, using conveyor belts and pulley elevators, it
caused one local to remark in the General Advertiser that “to such perfection are our grist
and merchant mills brought, by the assistance of [this automated mill], that we may
say…that they are not equaled in the world.”29 Later, in 1817, a writer in Niles’ Weekly
Register had a similar attitude about the practical application of new technologies at the
Gilpin’s paper mills. In this case, the introduction of new machines for manufacturing
paper on an expanded scale was again calculated to save on labor as the mills now did the
work of ten paper vats. Most applicable to Wilmington’s community of manufacturers
was the writer’s final reflection that the Gilpin establishment, as part of the greater
neighborhood, “will aid its improvement, and add to the valuable manufactories on the
Brandywine.”30 In this case, “improvement” refers to the gain in private wealth and
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public reputation that commentators believed these new designs and increased output
would bring to the city and its surrounding region. For manufacturers, the success of
specific inventors and industries in the Brandywine community was alluring.
Furthermore, producers were not satisfied with mechanical innovation and improvements
to their own operations. Instead, in the early nineteenth century, they actively sought to
boost economic opportunity for all by supporting public and private works that helped
shape and develop the city and its region.
Following the American Revolution, influential groups and societies throughout the
new nation actively promoted the development of necessary public infrastructure such as
roads, canals, and bridges, to facilitate commercial and information exchange. Local and
national governments greatly contributed to these efforts by providing stability and acting
as organizing bodies for those with the means and desire to initiate internal projects.
Wilmington’s many industrialists and citizens were no exception to this. In 1806 for
example, the Delaware Legislature passed an act incorporating a company to erect a
bridge over the Brandywine Creek. Several Wilmington producers were appointed to
execute this project, including Thomas Lea, James Canby, and William Poole, merchants
who owned mills along the Brandywine.31 Two years later in 1808, the Legislature
passed an act creating a company to construct a turnpike road from Wilmington to the
Delaware and Pennsylvania state line. Once again the commission was composed of
Wilmington merchants and millers, this time including Jacob Broom—the previous
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owner of the DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills site.32 In promoting and endorsing these
projects, many manufacturers and merchants believed they would not only be improving
communication between their own and neighboring towns, but also facilitating access to
new resources and the opening of new marketplaces for their goods. This was the case
with the proposed Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. Though not completed until 1829,
work began on the canal following its incorporation in 1802. After a number of
construction delays and insufficient revenue, the Canal Company’s president and
directors made one of several petitions to the United States Congress in 1809 for
protection and aid. One of the company’s directors was Joshua Gilpin, a Wilmington
manufacturer and proprietor of the aforementioned paper mills. Gilpin, along with the
company’s president and other directors, argued that the canal was instrumental in
linking together a key region of the nation’s commerce, and also in unifying the country
politically. If the canal was not completed, they suggested, the nation would “not only
cease to increase in its agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing importance, but must
sink below the level of its neighbors in its political consequence.”33 In its fragile early
years of independence, America’s political autonomy depended on its economic strength
and viability. Additionally, the Canal Company’s petition was suggestive of an active
interstate competition that continued to animate the behaviors of local and regional
economic boosters. To ensure that their areas could maintain a competitive edge, it was
crucial for individuals from cities like Wilmington to create infrastructure, and facilitate
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market activity. Ultimately, these improvements in transportation, shipping, and
communication encouraged the development of specific places, regions, and the entire
nation.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, such efforts transformed Wilmington
into a profitable location for the establishment of new industries and manufactories.
Fortuitously located between two larger cities that organized the hinterlands and trade
around them, Wilmington utilized neighboring resources and capitalized on its role as a
manufacturing community. The city’s advantageous geography, containing multiple
rivers and abundant water power, and manufacturing tradition was attractive to new
producers hoping to establish and grow their businesses. Together the natural and built
environments spawned a community determined to promote its interests and
achievements and develop its surroundings. While the citizens of Wilmington
undoubtedly relied on neighboring cities for important resources and financial support,
they also challenged the hegemony of those places. As one historian observed, “even
though Wilmington had numerous tanneries, foundries, shipbuilding firms and the like,
the men who owned these businesses saw themselves in competition with rivals in other
cities rather than with one another.”34 Furthermore, the sheer number of milling sites
along the Brandywine and Christina testified to Wilmington’s productivity and
importance. Yet, of all the industrial establishments and geographic improvements that
materialized during this period, it was, as one contemporary declared, “those belonging to
the Duponts [sic]” that were most worthy of attention, “as here a village has grown up
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with in a few years.”35 DuPont was able to construct this working “village” because
industrialists, merchants, and the citizens of Wilmington, through private and public
endeavors, constructed a networked environment and manufacturing community that
harnessed natural resources and facilitated economic exchange. With an understanding of
the natural advantages and occurrences that made Wilmington an ideal industrial city,
this account now turns to the DuPont’s efforts to utilize this environment and further
shape and develop it.

Creating a Working Environment: Selecting a Site
and Industrial Organization
In April of1802, E.I. du Pont departed from New York and passed through Bristol
and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on route to Wilmington, Delaware. Within days of
arriving, Irénée completed the purchase of an eighty-acre wooded milling site owned by
the Quaker and patriot Jacob Broom.36Several days before, his father, Pierre Samuel du
Pont, congratulated him on the impending purchase. “We are very glad that you are
satisfied with your purchase,” the elder du Pont exclaimed, “and that you will have help
from [Mr. Broom] with your building.”37 In the completing their acquisition of this land,
the du Ponts also received a water dam, a millrace, the remnants of a milling building,
and a wealth of trees and agricultural plots that already occupied the purchased acres.
Due to the presence of these resources and structural “improvements,” this purchase
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signified a crossroads for the DuPont Company, rather than a beginning. This future site
of the Eleutherian Mills was only settled upon after a long search for the right
environment in which to establish the company. Additionally, the site’s ultimate selection
began a new period of developing the internal and external landscape to accommodate
the needs of a productive gunpowder manufactory. Building a productive landscape
capable of turning out thousands of barrels of gunpowder every year required more than a
dam, millrace, and a few milling buildings for stamping and mixing the powder. Instead,
constructing and operating the necessary mills and buildings for manufacturing and
storing the powder placed demands on the local and surrounding ecology while creating a
workplace environment that structured the family and workers’ daily lives and influenced
the growth and concerns of an early American city. Overall, the DuPont’s economic
world and culture shaped the development of the land and governed its relationship with
Wilmington and its surrounding environs.
Before the DuPont Company built a working environment for their powder
manufactory, they had to secure a proper location for its development. In searching for
the ideal place to establish the company, the natural features of different geographies
played a crucial role. First and foremost, an abundant water source was needed to provide
a year-round supply of waterpower. Additionally, the presence of other resources
including wood and stones for building, access to waterways and ports for shipping,
proximity to raw materials, and the accessibility of labor sources and marketplaces, were
all important factors contributing to E.I. du Pont’s decision of where to locate his
manufacture. Initially, Washington City, the nation’s new capital, was thought to be the
most ideal location, as government business was considered essential to the new
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company’s survival. Yet, upon observing the Chesapeake region’s potential for a powder
manufactory firsthand, E.I. du Pont was appalled. Writing to his father while still in
Georgetown, he remarked that “there is absolutely no opportunity in Maryland or
Virginia near Federal City,” rather “the country, the people, [were] all worthless.” Almost
as an afterthought at the end of the letter, Irénée mentioned that he would, “stay a day at
Wilmington to see the Brandywine.”38 Of course this trip turned out to be fruitful, and
resulted in several return trips, as du Pont found a favorable site in Broom’s land. In
addition to the Brandywine’s available waterpower, the creek offered a communication
channel directly into Wilmington, and through the city, a connection to the Delaware
River’s busy shipping thoroughfare. Furthermore, du Pont calculated that Broom’s land
would save money on the construction of the milling site itself because it contained
sufficient quantities of wood.39 This wood was such a necessary addition that the deal
was almost cancelled when du Pont came to believe Broom was cutting down and
removing the precious oak. He expressed this frustration in several letters to Peter
Bauduy and his family, and did not relax about the issue until Broom assured him that he
had not cut any of the oak, and instead only a small amount of chestnut used to construct
a fence.40 Ultimately, DuPont decided to purchase Broom’s property due to its
advantageous location and the presence of key natural resources.
Another factor that ensured the company’s selection of Broom’s Brandywine site was
its proximity to urbanizing Wilmington. For du Pont, the site’s location a few miles
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outside the city was favorable both for its remoteness from the urban center and for its
nearness to it. E.I. du Pont worried about cities’ distractions when he suggested, while
still searching for the proper site for his manufactory, that “this location need not be near
a city,” and “on the contrary the discipline that should control the workmen makes it
desirable to be at some distance from cities,” though he added that this was only true
“provided there is proper facility for transportation by water.”41 Another beneficial reason
for maintaining a measureable distance from cities, especially those on America’s east
coast, was disease. Yellow fever was a recurring problem on the mid-Atlantic coast as
E.I. du Pont’s brother Victor reminded him. After the family settled along the
Brandywine, Victor, who was still in New York, alerted his brother that “the papers say
that the yellow fever is increasing in your neighborhood every day,” and to “not go too
often to the city.”42 By keeping one’s distance in the country, it was much easier to avoid
the diseases and distractions often associated with cities or more densely populated
environments.
The drawbacks to being within or too near a city were often outweighed, however, by
the personal and economic opportunities they offered. In E.I. du Pont’s case, not only did
Wilmington provide an ideal environment for his powder mills and essential natural
resources, it also housed numerous French émigrés that assisted the DuPont Company’s
early development. During the 1790s and early 1800s, Philadelphia and parts of Northern
Delaware attracted a number of Frenchmen and French-speaking refugees from
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upheavals in revolutionary France and the French colony Santo Domingo.43 A number of
these French immigrants settled in Wilmington and provided important cultural ties
without which it is unclear that the company would have located and survived where it
did. Two individuals, Peter Bauduy and William Hamon, were particularly helpful to the
company’s early establishment, both settled in America years earlier, learned to speak
English, and were engaged in business around Wilmington. E.I. du Pont was not a native
English speaker, and because of this the relationship he formed with these two men, both
refugees from Santo Domingo, allowed him to navigate the laws, procedures, and
relationships necessary to purchase land in Delaware. Du Pont’s friendship with these
men was another pull-factor that convinced him to settle along the Brandywine. Writing
to Bauduy, who eventually invested heavily in the company and served a number of years
as one of its proprietors, E.I. du Pont highlighted the advantages of settling near
Wilmington. The city offered “the ease of making shipments,” he explained, “and the
pleasure of being near you and your family.”44 That both Bauduy and Hamon arranged
the purchase of Broom’s land with Hamon’s name on the title further suggests that these
cultural acquaintances assisted the company.45 Overall, the advantages of being both near
and slightly distant from the city made Broom’s land on the Brandywine the ideal place
for the company’s founding.
After taking residence along the Brandywine, E.I. du Pont set about erecting several
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mill buildings to begin producing gunpowder. Along with the mills, the DuPont
Company employed several laborers to dig out millraces and construct additional
buildings to dry and store completed powder. In early 1803, E.I. du Pont wrote to his
father about the construction’s progress, noting that they had “in three months built a
large house and barn of stone and a large part of the refinery…the water course and the
saw mill,” but they still had to build “three mills, one or two other buildings…a new race
for one of the mills,” and “quarters for the men.”46 Clearly the mill site was a large
project, as the process of producing gunpowder required multiple steps with the
ingredients—saltpetre, sulfur, and charcoal—being mixed together, pressed, glazed to
remove moisture, dried, and stored. Each one of these steps—and this is not a
comprehensive list—required a separate building that occupied a distinct space at the mill
site. The capital, planning, and labor expended to complete the mills was just the
beginning. In churning out the first barrels of powder in May of 1804, the DuPont lands
became a working environment once again.47 In noting this, it must not be forgotten that
the flowing water, dams, millraces, waterwheels, machinery, workmen, and employers
were conspiring toward a shared end. The production of gunpowder from numerous
compositional parts was the purpose that drove the company, the people, and the
resources it used to obtain this goal.
But as driven as it was by production, DuPont’s mills and working landscape served
more than economic ends. One historian suggests that early American factories “were
about organization as much as the length of work rosters or the roar of intricate
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machines.”48 This observation applies well in DuPont’s case as the Eleutherian Mills site
not only organized and coordinated gunpowder production, but also the family’s lives
and business duties, and the social and economic lives of those employed by the
company. Whether as the recipient of bags of saltpetre or barrels of sulfur, such as those
sent to the company by Victor du Pont in 1803, or as the site of a willow tree farm—used
to make charcoal—or as a place for cultivating produce, the mills along the Brandywine
operated as a central place that organized the lives of those who lived and worked there.49
Much like the plantation landscape that organized the American South’s economy and
social life, milling communities and large manufactories had the same influence on their
surrounding populations. Before occupying the Brandywine location, E.I. du Pont asked
Jacob Broom to prepare for his coming by plowing a clover field, planting corn and
potatoes—two staple and multipurpose crops—and putting fences around the pasture
lands. The sooner these preparations were made the better, because by the spring of 1803
the company already employed forty men that needed constant supervision and
direction.50 When by 1829 the company employed 127 men, and had 335 people living
on company property, it was clear the DuPont mills were more than just a few productive
buildings.51 Rather, in addition to the manufactory, with its own purpose to create powder
and generate wealth, the site served the daily needs of workers and their families.
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Other significant ways the company organized their Brandywine landscape were
through efforts to acquire new lands and expand their production, to construct housing for
workers, and to maintain a balance between the living and working environment. After
purchasing Broom’s land, E.I. du Pont, as head of the company, consistently added new
property to his initial holdings. Between 1810 and 1818 alone, the company made eight
separate land purchases ranging in size from around twenty acres to several that were
well over one hundred acres.52 Included in these purchases was Rumford Dawes’
Brandywine property that became the Hagley Mills powder yard. This land was used for
several purposes as portions were set aside for agricultural cultivation and as pasture for
the company’s growing collection of merino sheep. The company also used the land to
provide housing for its workers. Many of the company’s laborers were immigrants, and
after training these workers in their safeguarded procedures, the company hoped to
maintain their loyalty. One way they did so was by inviting the workers to live, along
with their families, adjacent to the company’s manufacturing mills. “Between 1806 and
1814,” according to one historian, “four semi-detached stone houses and two detached
houses…were added to the property.” Located just above the powder yard, these homes
provided accommodations for ten workmen and their families.53 In 1810, the company’s
subsidiary textile manufactory, DuPont, Bauduy and Company, also added forty-five
houses for mill operatives.54 It is almost assured that many of the two company’s
workers, and proprietary families themselves, worked and lived on company property.
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Figure 9: A map of the property owned by E.I. du Pont in 1826. The inscription notes
that the land contains two hundred and eighty six acres with five perches. The larger
house in the upper center is Eleutherian Mills, the du Pont family’s home. Below the
house, and along the river, are several of the company’s first mills. On the left, and once
again abutting the Brandywine, is the Hagley Mills site acquired in 1813. It is also
apparent that large portions of the property are undeveloped or contain few permanent
structures. This land was used for farming, pasture, and resource cultivation—such as the
willow trees for charcoal production. Source: Lands Owned by E.I. du Pont, Fairlamb
Survey, 1826, Longwood Manuscripts, Group 9, Series C, 20100616_fairlamb_0001.tif,
Hagley Museum and Library.
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With living quarters and workplace occupying a single landscape, the DuPont
Company’s manufactory operated as a small scale community. The site became an early
company town or industrial village, where most employees lived in single-family
dwelling units “built closely together, like urban houses.”55 Between 1809 and 1814 the
company built a store where workers could purchase necessities. 56 Yet, it is not always
helpful to think of Eleutherian Mills as a self-sustaining community with only limited
contact to an outside world. Rather, E.I du Pont ensured that this would not be the case by
locating his manufactory a short distance from Wilmington. His family and company
workers were therefore able to maintain ties with other businesses, religious institutions,
and personal relations residing in the city or along the Brandywine. During the War of
1812, the DuPont Company reinforced their commitment to national defense by
responding to a warning that their powder mills were a likely British target. To counteract
the potential threat, the company joined with neighboring Brandywine manufactures to
organize a brigade of men and defend their surrounding territory.57 This volunteer
regiment, known as the Brandywine Rangers, was eventually disbanded after the
Delaware State Legislature repealed a law exempting manufactures from militia duty.
This frustrated E.I. du Pont as he believed the volunteers to be better organized and
armed than the state militia.58 Shortly thereafter, some of these volunteers likely joined
neighboring militia forces at Camp DuPont where they formed a 3,600-person-strong
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brigade.59 These men were not only willing to defend their homes and neighbors’, but did
so voluntarily and as part of a larger community.
Though much went on socially for those who lived their lives on DuPont’s
Brandywine property, the workplace environment was perhaps the greatest way that the
company organized and regulated the landscape.60 While structures such as the powder
yard gates marking the boundary between home life and work life, were commonplace in
other factories or manufacturing villages, the DuPont Company utilized some unique
designs. E.I. du Pont’s family home was built on a hill overlooking the river and milling
sites. Interestingly, once again blending family and work life, the house doubled as E.I.’s
office space and had a balcony where he could oversee the mill workers.61 The company
used other techniques to observe and regulate the workplace, especially after the mills
were damaged following several explosive accidents between 1810 and 1820. The deadly
1818 explosion in particular was partially blamed on a negligent foreman. Because of
this, E.I. du Pont “stipulated that at least one member of his family must personally
oversee the yard at all times.”62
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Industrial Accidents along the Brandywine
Powder explosions and subsequent fires posed a threat to the milling site, and the
company’s entire property. E.I. du Pont acknowledged that such explosions were
inevitable, so he composed a unique architectural plan for his mills with this hazard in
mind. Instead of a single large mill or factory building, Irénée divided production
between several smaller buildings. Furthermore, instead of a solid structure with four
solid walls, he designed the mills with only three solid stone walls and a fourth wall, the
one facing the river, made of flimsy wood. The roof was also built with wood and slanted
to face the river.63 Though not always successful in containing larger explosions, this
design was certainly effective in some cases and lessened the degree of damage in others.
As one newspaper account of an 1820 explosion at the company reveals, “the improved
method adopted by Mr. DuPont…is successful.” It goes on to describe that when one of
the mills exploded, “the roof was thrown into the creek,” but no person was hurt and the
rest of the mills continued to operate “as if no explosion had taken place.”64 This
“improved” mill design and the other particularities of DuPont’s built-environment took
into account the importance of workplace safety and organization.
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Figure 10: E.I. du Pont’s drawing and design for a rolling mill on his site. This drawing
shows the slanted roof design meant to direct any potential explosion out over the water.
Also in this picture are the three solid sides of the mill, with the roof and fourth side
made from wood. Source: E.I. du Pont Drawings of Powder Mills and Machinery, No.
119, Roll Mills, n.d., Drawing, Gunpowder, Factories, dupontdrawing_11900001.tif,
Hagley Museum and Library.
Explosion and workplace accidents were ever present in powder mills, and it was
more of a question when not if another would happen. The ever present specter of
industrial accidents highlighted the often cruel reality of many working environments.
The historiography of industrial accidents has particularly emphasized the economic and
social costs to both the industrialists and workers involved. This is understandable, as
early nineteenth century reports concerning mill fires and explosions often mentioned the
number killed and the cost of damages.65 But more recently, historians including Jamie
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Bronstein have shown that the early nineteenth century focus on workers’ emotions and
individual heroics kept contemporaries from asking how the workplace could be made
safer or who should bear the cost of accidents.66 Arthur McEvoy depicts the workplace as
an ecological system with the worker’s body at its core. Industrial accidents are,
therefore, the ecological consequence of workplace organization and regulation.67 Both
authors offer strong analyses and are correct in many respects, except that,
uncharacteristic for industrial producers in this period, DuPont tried to build safety into
the workplace and offered compensation and aid to the families of those killed by
workplace accidents. 68 What neither author mentions, however, is that industrial
accidents often extended beyond the workplace itself and posed risks to workers’ homes
and families, neighboring towns, and the natural environment.
Accidents resulting in explosions at the DuPont gunpowder mills are well
documented in both family correspondence and newspapers. Though many of the
accounts present personal details and descriptions of company damage, they also describe
the impact that accidents had on the landscape and on surrounding spectators. On the
morning of March 19, 1818, the company was hit with its most devastating explosion to
date and for some time to come. While E.I. du Pont was away in Philadelphia on
business, a fire ripped through the upper powder yard destroying the pounding mill,
powder magazine—where they stored finished powder—and several other buildings. At
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least thirty-five people were killed and several others were injured, including some
family members of the workers. Descriptions of the dead were brutally honest. A
relatively mild account of the incident explains that “The bodies of most of the deceased
were blown into pieces and scattered at great distances from each other.”69 E.I. du Pont’s
wife Sophie and his brother-in-law Charles were both injured in the accident. The
family’s house was also heavily damaged, as the “windows, floors, and roof…were
blown off.”70 Most interestingly, regarding the company’s connection with its
environment, reporters also described damage to the natural surroundings. “The fences,
trees, [were] all leveled to the ground,” one reporter remarked, and “some large hickories
are twisted and broken as if struck by lightning.”71 Furthermore, the blast shocked
Wilmington, as citizens poured out from their houses to discover the commotion’s
source. It was initially feared that the city itself might have been damaged by the blast.72
So, while these explosions were undoubtedly devastating for the company on a number of
levels, they were also an intimate part of its working environment. To produce their
gunpowder, the company organized the soils and trees, the creek that powered their
machinery, and the workers’ bodies who labored to create the powder. Additionally,
because the possible magnitude and reach of an explosion was so great, and since the
company was located only a short distance from the city, the families of workers, the
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owners who lived on site, and the citizens of Wilmington all shared the potential risks of
an industrial accident.
In short, after selecting a site for their powder works along the Brandywine Creek in
Northern Delaware, the DuPont Company quickly shaped the landscape around it. An
advantageous location to inaugurate a new business, the company joined Wilmington’s
and the Brandywine region’s active community of manufacturers, merchants, and skilledlaborers. On several hundred acres of land accumulated over a twenty-year period, the
company erected dams on the creek, millraces, waterwheel powdered mills, stone
quarries, family and worker housing, and engaged in both agriculture and silviculture on
the land. The world they built along the Brandywine went far to organize the social and
economic lives of those who worked and lived there. As the company continued to grow
and abut against other manufactures and landowners along the Brandywine, it became
more and more a part of Wilmington’s extended landscape. Furthermore, the working
environment was not contained by the site’s imaginary property lines, fences, and gates.
When explosions happened at the manufactory, they ravaged the lives of those who lived
and worked at the mills, damaged non-human life, and threatened the security of
neighboring lives and structures. As the company progressed into the future and grew
economically, it increasingly shaped and organized a working environment whose
influence extended beyond its enclosures and into other realms.

Urban Growth and Industry
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Wilmington, Delaware’s geography
and society made it a beneficial place for industrial and agricultural production. One
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historian noted that compared to other regions in Europe and the United States, no
equivalent area rivaled that of the Northeastern United States for navigable or power
producing rivers, and none were bordered by as fertile lands as those in the Delaware and
Chesapeake regions.73 Wilmington, in particular, was situated between two powerproducing rivers and adjacent to the Delaware’s navigable thoroughfare. Additionally, the
community of manufactures, merchants, and agricultural producers in and around the city
actively promoted their trades and facilitated public works to streamline transportation
and improve development. In 1811, Delaware even passed a law to encourage and assist
manufactures within the state. The law exempted artificers and workmen “concerned or
employed as such in the manufacture of paper, iron, gun-powder, woolen yarn, woolen
cloth,” and others, from service in the state’s militia. Additionally, it outlawed and issued
penalties against attempts to seduce or lure workers away from their employers.74 Though
passed after the DuPont Company’s establishment, but seemingly with their stability in
mind, this law further attests to the general importance afforded to manufactures in the
state. Ultimately, the state and city’s geography, beneficial location between two growing
metropolises, and economic community encouraged the du Ponts to locate their powder
manufacture along the Brandywine Creek and begin creating a working environment.
After selecting their location, the DuPont Company proceeded to construct
production and living facilities that organized the landscape around them. Because the
property included employee and family housing, it operated as a small urban community
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ensconced in a rural hamlet outside of Wilmington. Over time, the manufacture, and
those who lived there, became an important part of urbanizing Wilmington. As the
company continued to grow physically, it abutted against other manufactures that lined
the Brandywine. Along with its neighbors, the Eleutherian Mills formed a contiguous link
of milling sites and settlements leading into Wilmington. Not long after establishing the
company, E.I. du Pont became actively involved in city life. In early 1808 he purchased
stock in the Wilmington Library Company and made annual payments for his family’s
use of the Wilmington Bridge.75 Years later, in 1817, du Pont acted as president for the
Society of the State of Delaware for the Promotion of Manufactures. Not only did this
group meet in Wilmington, but many of its members were du Pont’s neighboring
manufacturers. Furthermore, the continued growth of his company ensured that the du
Pont family would be influential in Wilmington for years to come.
This is all to say that the company’s growth and built environment were a part of
Wilmington’s overall development. Certain environments and places often attract
different types of creativity and innovation. Once they do, those innovators, activists, and
industrialists participate in, build, or mold the environments around them. Wilmington’s
environment and society in the first decades of the nineteenth century were ideal for new
manufactures. This was not only the case for DuPont, but for other entrepreneurs such as
the Tatnall and Gilpin families, who improved flour grinding and paper making
procedures respectively.76 Close proximity and transportation to markets, waterpower,
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sources for finance and labor, and an industrious spirit all contributed to DuPont and
these other manufacturers’ stability and growth. That DuPont and other companies
maintained a prominent place in and helped organize Wilmington’s landscape over the
past two-hundred years attests to the lasting influence of innovation on spatial growth.
Though many factors supported urban growth in Wilmington, and the mid-Atlantic,
during the early republic and into the nineteenth century, the presence and proliferation of
industries like DuPont, and their organization of the built-environment, should be more
thoroughly contemplated. Additionally, the congruence of factors that generate
innovative environments can help historians understand the culture that fueled America’s
economic growth.
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CONCLUSION
Walking the grounds of the Hagley Museum and Library on the urban edge of
Wilmington, Delaware, one can enjoy the rustling sounds of the Brandywine River, take
shade under a towering black walnut tree, or be startled by a scampering groundhog as it
makes its way across a graveled road. Yet, interspersed throughout this idyllic rural
scenery are a number of built structures that have occupied the immediate landscape for
over two-hundred years as part of the DuPont Company’s original powder mills. Stone
buildings and working water mills, remnants of the Eleutherian Mills, have been carefully
preserved to serve as educational tools and entertainment for the researchers, students,
and visitors that venture to the museum each year. Ensconced in this scenic and guarded
environment is one of the country’s best remaining relics of early American
industrialization. Few places offer such a remarkably intact view of the working and
living spaces of industrial laborers and entrepreneurial families. In a world where change
occurs at a rapid pace, and where homes and factories are regularly destroyed or built
anew, the Hagley Museum’s grounds contain a number of structures that have survived
the last two centuries. It is unlikely these structures would continue to persist had the
DuPont Company not been motivated by a national economic culture that encouraged
entrepreneurs to engage in institutional growth and development.
In the decades following the Revolution, Americans increasingly moved away from
an international economy based on shipping and foreign markets for surplus agriculture
to a more self-sufficient national economy. Individual entrepreneurs and companies
utilized this national dialogue to promulgate the necessity and importance of domestic
innovation and industrial production. An emerging trans-Atlantic industrial capitalist
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culture spurred the actions of these individuals and manifested in their attempts to
establish markets and exchange networks for domestically produced goods. The DuPont
Company was a key participant in this nationalizing economy. Its proprietors vigorously
defended the national importance of their gunpowder and sought to ascertain a reputation
for unsurpassed quality. The company also employed a network of sales agents to
disseminate its powder throughout the United States. Not to forget the role of the state,
the federal government was active in offering vocal and material support for new
manufacturers—as the DuPont case shows—and eventually in offering legislative
support through the embargo and subsequent tariffs. Yet, despite the increased attention
paid to domestic producers, industrial growth was only largely occurring in specific
geographies. Places like Wilmington, Delaware were well suited for manufacturing and
the city’s proximity to some of the nation’s more prominent commercial centers made it
an early site of innovative and industrial activity.
This economic culture entailed a form a physical development that is visible in
DuPont’s organization of the landscape around it. The company planned a working
environment where workers and their families lived out their economic, and much of
their social, lives. In doing so, DuPont erected an early industrial village that maintained
important connections to Wilmington. As one author suggests, E.I. du Pont imagined his
powder facilities and workers’ housing as “a kind of ‘middle landscape’ between the city
and the wilderness.”1 By highlighting the industrial village’s role as a middle territory
between the city and wilderness, one might draw comparisons to modern discussions
about the role of suburbs in urban growth. If twentieth-century suburbs and individual
development sites were small-scale “nuclei in the penumbra” of their neighboring cities,

1

Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 210.
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that filled in over time, industrial villages and edge settlements had a similar relationship
to America’s early cities.2 Industrial communities were instrumental in shaping
America’s built environment and urban layout. DuPont’s working environment at the
beginning of the nineteenth-century was one of several along the Brandywine that
maintained important links to neighboring cities—especially Wilmington—and utilized
their resources. DuPont’s continued growth into the twentieth century has seen it become
even more a part of Wilmington’s everyday existence. The company’s current
headquarters are located in the city’s downtown, while numerous industrial factory sites
and family mansions remain in the surrounding area.
In 1872, with some temporal distance from America’s initial period of
industrialization, Elizabeth Montgomery, a Wilmington citizen, recalled an anecdote
illustrating the innovative mentality that gripped a number of Americans at the turn of the
eighteenth century. On the day train cars commenced running from Wilmington, a young
Elizabeth encountered a man who excitedly explained that, years earlier, his father had
met the mechanical innovator Oliver Evans who remarked that “the time was not far off
when it would be only a day’s journey from Philadelphia to Baltimore, and that carriages
would be invented to go without horses.”3 Of course, the man’s father thought this was
preposterous and mocked Evans. Not only was Evans correct in his prediction, but the
conviction he displayed was reminiscent of a growing attitude among antebellum


2

Ernest M. Fisher, quoted in Greg Hise, Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth Century
Metropolis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1. In a related observation, regarding
the location of industrial settlements specifically, a pair of authors notes that industries often sprung up near
larger metropolitan regions or medium-sized regional cities. They were part of a “knife-edge” phenomenon
that explains regional growth as jetting out from an already existing center due to the availability of skilled
labor and resource availability. This is applicable to industrial villages such as DuPont’s because the
company had similar reasons for locating its business near Wilmington, and its personal growth was part of
the city and region’s larger urban development. Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist
Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial Growth (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 75.
3
Elizabeth Montgomery, Reminiscences of Wilmington (Wilmington, Del., 1872), 15.
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innovators and producers. America’s capitalist culture motivated individuals to expand
the scale of production, design new goods, and engineer speedy ways for these goods to
travel and reach markets. Driven by this mindset, Evans’ hope for future advancements
was part of a widening sentiment that equated America’s national development with
economic growth and technological achievement.
Individual industries and entrepreneurs occupied a strong role at the forefront of a
culture that linked industry to economic independence and national development. This
thesis argues that, the DuPont Company, as one such individual producer, was active in
efforts to fuse manufacturing with national prosperity. The company also helped to
secure support for American industries, so that they might survive their fragile nascent
years with stronger prospects for success. DuPont built its name and reputation so that in
short time it became “synonymous with gunpowder.”4 The company’s founders also
cultivated a close relationship with the federal government and sought to achieve
economic protections for all manufactures by serving in the Society of the State of
Delaware for the Promotion of American Manufactures. Through these efforts, the
DuPont family and company, along with many others in the northern and middle states
and parts of the south, helped secure tariffs and other protective measures, thereby
turning America’s political economy away from its earlier free-trade ideologies.5

4

Gavin Weightman, The Industrial Revolutionaries: The Making of the Modern World, 1776-1914 (New
York: Grove Press, 2007), 87.
5
Daniel Walker Howe addresses the popular acceptance of tariffs in the early nineteenth-century by region.
He notes that New England needed to industrial due to poor soils and a short growing season, and the
growth of textile mills in there encouraged protectionist sentiments. As, this paper argues, tariffs were of
course important in the middle states as well where mills dotted the landscape especially outside Baltimore,
Philadelphia, and Wilmington. Howe also suggests that the South did not support these tariffs because they
diminished demand on southern cotton. There were, however, three “islands of protectionist sentiment” in
the South, including: “the sugarcane growers in Louisiana, [Henry] Clay’s hemp growers in Kentucky and
Missouri, and the Appalachian valleys of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina, where the
predominately non-slaveholding population continued to hope for industrial development of their natural
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DuPont’s growth and the rise of other manufacturing companies highlighted the
emergence of industrial capitalism in nineteenth-century America. The culture that
propelled these groups linked industry to national prosperity and unleashed development
in certain directions. As DuPont’s story suggests, the company was active in assisting
development nationally, regionally, and locally. By producing powder for the federal
government and defending manufacturing, it aided national stability and economic
independence. Regionally, DuPont created markets for its powder in neighboring urban
centers thereby boosting shipping and commerce in those local economies. Additionally,
its powder was used to blast rocky areas and form canals to open up internal navigation.
Finally, DuPont’s footprint, and that of other industrial institutions, was perhaps most
profound on a local scale. The company’s working environment organized the economic
and social lives of workers and their families and transformed the natural world around it.
Its growth added to Wilmington’s, and as the company extended its landholdings and
boundaries it became ever more a part of that city. This final point is continually relevant
as the company maintains its headquarters in Wilmington and preserves its initial factory
site in the form of the Hagley Museum and Library.


resources and water power.” Therefore, support for tariff protections in the early nineteenth-century
existed, at least partially, throughout much of the United States. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God
Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 272273.
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